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Abstract
We study the design of optimal rating systems in the presence of adverse selection
and moral hazard. Buyers and sellers interact in a competitive market where goods
are vertically dierentiated according to their qualities. Sellers dier in their cost of
quality provision, which is private information to them. An intermediary observes
sellers’ quality and chooses a rating system, i.e., a signal of quality for buyers, in order
to incentivize sellers to produce high-quality goods. We provide a full characterization
of the set of payos and qualities that can arise in equilibrium under an arbitrary rating
system. We use this characterization to analyze Pareto optimal rating systems when
seller’s quality choice is deterministic and random.
∗We thank James Best, Aislinn Bohren, Odilon Camara, Emir Kamenica, Alexey Kushnir, Jacobo Perego,
and Ilya Segal as well as various seminar and conference participants for their helpful comments.
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1 Introduction
The problem of information control is at the heart of the design of markets with asymmetric
information. On platforms such as Airbnb or eBay, where buyers often nd it dicult to
evaluate the quality of the service or product being oered, information provided by the
platform can mitigate some of the problems arising from adverse selection and moral hazard.
In insurance markets, where providers do not have precise information about insurees and
want to condition contracts on public signals, regulators control which information can be
used by providers. This centrally provided information can be used to incentivize the parties
involved and improve allocative eciency in the market. In this paper, we study the design
of information control – henceforth rating systems – in markets with adverse selection and
moral hazard.
We perform this exercise in a competitive model with adverse selection and moral haz-
ard. In our model, seller types are privately known, and each seller produces a single product
that is vertically dierentiated by its quality. Producing higher-quality goods is costly for
the sellers, but it is less so for higher-type sellers than for lower-type ones. Buyers are
uninformed about the quality of the product sold in the market and have to rely on the in-
formation provided by an intermediary, who observes product quality and sends a signal to
buyers. We refer to such signal structure as a rating system.
Our goal in this paper is twofold. First, we characterize the allocations of qualities that
are achievable by an arbitrary rating system (i.e., implementable allocations). Second, we
describe the properties of optimal rating systems when quality outcomes are deterministic
and random. In our analysis, optimality of rating systems are evaluated according objectives
associated with Pareto optimality, i.e., those that maximize a weighted average of buyers’
and sellers’ payos, as well as the revenue earned by the intermediary.
Buyers use the information provided by the intermediary to form expectations about the
quality of the goods in the market. This information also impacts sellers’ choice of quality.
In particular, on the one hand, sellers’ incentives for choosing a quality level are aected by
how this choice aects the expected prices. On the other hand, since all buyers value quality
equally, their posterior belief about sellers’ quality is reected in product prices. Therefore,
the main determinant of sellers’ incentives is their (second-order) belief about buyers’ pos-
terior beliefs after observing their signal. We refer to these second-order expectations as
sellers’ signaled qualities. As a result, characterizing the set of payos and allocations boils
down to characterizing these second-order expectations. This is in addition to the standard
notion of incentive compatibility, which is associated with the optimal choice of quality by
sellers.
Our main implementability result is that these second-order expectations are related
to the chosen qualities via a weighted-majorization ranking. In particular, we show that if
type θ sellers (distributed according to F and ranked by their eciency of quality provision)
choose quality q (θ), then their expectation of buyers’ expectation (upon realizing a signal),
q (θ), must F -majorize q (θ); in other words∫ θ
θ
q (θ) dF (θ) ≥
∫ θ
θ
q (θ) dF (θ) ,∀θ
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with equality for the highest type. The reverse is also true; that is, if q (θ) F -majorizes q (θ),
then a rating system can be constructed so that q (θ) is the expected value of buyers’ average
posterior from the perspective of a type θ seller.
This ranking of the two functions, q (θ) and q (θ), is equivalent to the standard notion
of mean preserving spread. In particular, it can be shown that q (·) F−majorizes q (·) if and
only if the random variable induced by q (·) using F (·) is a mean preserving spread of that
induced by q (·). This result, thus, can be regarded as an extension of Blackwell (1953)’s
result on the relationship between the distribution of the posterior mean and the prior for
an arbitrary signal structure. Recall that in our setup, since we need to consider sellers’
incentives in choosing quality, the characterization of the posterior mean is not sucient.
We have, thus, shown that the expectation of the posterior mean conditional on the state
(second-order expectations or signaled qualities) also satises the mean preserving spread
property of Blackwell (1953).
Using the majorization formulation has two benets: rst, it allows us to work with func-
tions of type θ sellers as opposed to distributions; second, when this inequality is binding
for a certain type θ, the equivalent rating system must separate sellers with quality below
q (θ) from those with higher quality, so their signals must not overlap. In other words, the
signals sent by the types below θ and those sent by the types with higher quality must not
overlap. Additionally, we provide an algorithm that constructs a rating system which im-
plements any schedule of second-order expectations (signaled qualities) and true qualities
when the type space is discrete. For continuous type spaces, this algorithm can be applied
by approximating continuous distributions with a discrete one.
This characterization of the set of implementable qualities and signaled qualities (i.e.,
sellers’ second-order expectations) allows us to cast the problem of optimal rating design as
a mechanism design problem. In particular, an allocation of qualities and signaled qualities
is implementable if and only if it satises the standard notion of incentive compatibility
together with the majorization ranking described above. If we interpret signaled qualities
as transfers, the problem of optimal rating design is equivalent to the standard mechanism
design with transferrable utility – such as that of Mussa and Rosen (1978), Baron and My-
erson (1982), and Myerson (1981), among many others – where transfers have to satisfy a
dispersion constraint implied by the majorization ranking. In the second part of the paper,
we provide techniques to solve a subset of such mechanism design problems, which are not
convex optimization problems, because of the presence of the majorization constraint. More
specically, we study two versions of our model: one in which quality outcomes for buyers
are deterministic and one in which they are random.
When chosen qualities are deterministic, the main classes of objectives that we consider
are the weighted sum of sellers’ payos. In particular, we allow for sellers’ welfare weights
to depend on their cost type. We consider three classes of rating systems: (1) low-quality
optimal, in which the welfare weights are decreasing in sellers’ types ; (2) high-quality-
seller optimal, in which welfare weights increase with θ (i.e., the sellers with a lower cost of
quality provision have a higher weight); and (3) mid-quality-seller optimal, in which welfare
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weights are hump-shaped in θ.1
There are a two main insights that arise from the analysis of the deterministic case. First,
random messages are a robust feature of optimal rating systems. This is mainly due to the
fact that quality outcomes can be fully controlled by sellers. As a result, if rating systems
are restricted to be deterministic this necessarily leads to bunching of types and jumps in
quality choices. To the extent that for a wide range of welfare weights, jumps in quality
choices are not desired, mixing must be introduced. In the class of objectives considered,
the optimal rating systems takes the form of what we call full mixing; one in which the
quality is revealed with some probability and otherwise a generic message – common to all
quality levels – is sent.
Second, information revelation interacts with whether welfare weights are increasing or
decreasing in seller quality, i.e., θ. Increasing welfare weights creates a motive for prots to
be reallocated to higher quality types. We show that in this case, the best that can be done
is to reveal all information. Note that when welfare weights are increasing, a mechanism
designer that has access to unrestricted monetary transfers reallocates prots by marginally
compensating choice of quality by more than one-to-one. When the rating system is incen-
tivizing sellers, the majorization result constrains the rewards for quality. More specically,
since dispersion of signaled qualities are less than that of chosen qualities, they cannot cre-
ate steep rewards for choice of quality by sellers. As a result, the best that can be done is
fully reveal quality. We establish this intuition via series of perturbation arguments in our
mechanism design problem.
In contrast, when the welfare weights are decreasing in seller quality, use of random
mixing is optimal. In this case, partial pooling of quality choices reduces the reward for
choice of quality and allows prots to be reallocated to lower types. Consideration of mid-
quality-seller optimal ratings conrms this insight. When welfare weights are hump-shaped
in θ, optimal rating system reveals all information for low qualities while it is full mixing
for middle and high qualities.
While probabilistic information structures are a common feature of Pareto optimal rat-
ings, they are somewhat uncommon in reality. We show that when quality outcomes are
random probabilistic information structures are not needed. That is, the mixing that is re-
quired in the deterministic model can be generated with monotone partitions. We consider
a version of our model where buyers’ quality outcomes cannot be directly controlled by the
seller; the sellers control the mean of the outcome while their cost depends on their type and
the mean. We focus on montone rating systems – those in which higher quality outcomes
lead to higher signaled qualities. In this environment, we show that optimal ratings always
take the form of monotone partitions where qualities are either fully revealed or pooled
with an interval around them. While in general characterization of optimal ratings is more
dicult, we develop a mathematical result that helps us provide partial characterization of
optimal ratings. We, then use this result to show that in a two type case, information must be
fully revealed for extreme realizations while it should pooled for intermediate realizations.
1This is similar to Dworczak et al. (forthcoming) where they consider a mechanism design problem with
arbitrary Pareto weights.
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Finally, we consider the case of a revenue maximizing intermediary that charges the
sellers a at fee for entering the market. The existence of such a fee leads to an ineciency
since some sellers do not enter the market; only sellers with low enough cost, i.e., high
enough θ enter. The rating system aects this entry margin by aecting the sellers’ prots.
Note that conditional on cuto type for entry, the intermediary’s revenue is maximized
when the payo of the cuto type is maximized. This would allow the intermediary to
charge a higher fee and increase its revenue. Thus, optimal rating system takes a full mixing
form.
1.1 Related Literature
Our paper is related to a few strands of literature in information economics and mechanism
design. Most closely, it is related to the Bayesian persuasion literature, as in Kamenica
and Gentzkow (2011), Rayo and Segal (2010), Alonso and Câmara (2016), and Dworczak
and Martini (2019), among many others. However, unlike most of this literature, in our
setup, the state in which an information structure is designed upon is itself endogenous.
As a result, the informed party’s decision is aected by the choice of information structure,
whereas in much of the Bayesian persuasion literature an uninformed receiver is taking
an action. A notable exception is the paper by Boleslavsky and Kim (2020) where they
consider a model with moral hazard where an agent controls the distribution of state with
her eort. They show that Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)’s concavication method extends
to their environment. In our setup, we are able to provide a sharp characterization of the
set of implementable outcomes. Furthermore, we are able to solve the resulting mechanism
design problem under fairly general assumptions on the cost function and distribution of
types. Kolotilin et al. (2017) study a problem of information transmission where one of
the parties is privately informed. However, in their setup, the informed party possesses
information about her payo which is independent of the state. In contrast, in our model
sellers are informed about the state (their cost type), and the information disclosure aects
their choice of quality.2
From a technical perspective, our paper is also related to a subset of the Bayesian persua-
sion literature that studies problems in which receivers’ actions depend on their posterior
mean. For example, Gentzkow and Kamenica (2016), Kolotilin (2018), Dworczak and Mar-
tini (2019), and Roesler and Szentes (2017) use Blackwell (1953)’s result that the existence
of an information structure is equivalent to the distribution of the posterior mean second-
order stochastically dominating (SOSD) the prior. However, in our study nding this poste-
rior mean is not enough, since sellers’ incentives depend on the expected prices, which are
themselves determined by the expectation of the posterior mean conditional on the state.
Our contribution to this literature is to show that any prole of second-order expectations
that dominates the chosen qualities in the sense of Second Order Stochastic Dominance can
be derived from some information structure. Moreover, we use the majorization ranking
2Few other papers have also focused on the joint problem of mechanism and information design; Guo and
Shmaya (2019) and Doval and Skreta (2019) are notable examples.
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in order to shed light on key properties of all the information structures that induce a cer-
tain distribution of second-order expectations.3 In our formulation, we use the majorization
ranking for the functions representing quality and signaled quality – second order expec-
tations. Thus our mechanism design problem is equivalent to a mechanism design problem
with transfers in which the transfer function majorizes the quality function. Similar to this
problem, Kleiner et al. (2020) solve a class of problems where majorization appears as a
constraint. Their solution method uses the characterization of extreme points of the set of
functions that majorizes a certain function. In contrast, our solution of the mechanism de-
sign problem involves calculus of variations due to the lack of linearity that is present in
their model.4
Our paper is also related to the extensive literature on contracting and mechanism de-
sign. Where as often the main assumption is that monetary transfers are available to pro-
vide incentives, in our setup incentives for quality provision are provided using the rating
system. In fact, this is often the case in multi-sided platforms: rider and driver ratings in
Uber and Lyft and seller badges in eBay and Airbnb are a few examples.5 A few notable ex-
ceptions are models that study the problem of certication and its interactions with moral
hazard: Albano and Lizzeri (2001), Zubrickas (2015), and Zapechelnyuk (2020).6 An im-
portant contribution is that of Albano and Lizzeri (2001) where a key assumption is that
the intermediary can charge an arbitrary fee schedule. The presence of an unrestricted fee
schedule potentially reduces the importance of the certication mechanism. This is in con-
trast with our model where monetary transfers are not exible. More recently, Zubrickas
(2015) and Zapechelnyuk (2020) also study variants of this problem. Their focus is, how-
ever, on deterministic ratings. As we show, random signals are an important feature of
optimal mechanisms. Additionally, we analyze ratings when qualities are random and not
fully controlled by the providers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we set up the model; in section
3, we describe the set of implementable allocations; in section 4 we describe Pareto-optimal
rating systems with deterministic quality choice, in section 5 we analyze the model with
random qualities, and nally in section 6 we consider some extensions of our model includ-
ing the problem of a revenue-maximizing intermediary.
3Dworczak and Martini (2019) develop a methodology akin to duality to solve a large class of such problems.
However, their methods do not apply to our case, as our resulting mechanism design problem is non-convex.
Thus, we have to use perturbation techniques, as described in section 4, to verify solutions.
4Gershkov et al. (2020) study optimal auction design with risk-averse bidders who have dual risk aversion
a la Yaari (1987). In their problem, the feasibility of allocations implies a majorization constraint on quantities,
i.e., probability of allocation of the object to each bidder. Similar to our paper, they use calculus of variations to
solve this problem. In contrast, our mechanism design problem is equivalent to a problem in which transfers
must be majorized by qualities. This together with incentive compatibility puts more restriction on the set of
implementable allocations.
5Higher value of these ratings could lead to priority in receiving the service while low values could lead
to exclusion from the platform.
6Evidently, our paper is also related to the extensive and growing literature that studies the problem of
certication and information disclosure (e.g., Lizzeri (1999), Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2010), Boleslavsky and
Cotton (2015), Harbaugh and Rasmusen (2018), and Hopenhayn and Saeedi (2020)).
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2 The Model
In this section, we describe our baseline model of adverse selection and moral hazard that
will provide the main framework for our analysis. We consider an economy with a contin-
uum of sellers and buyers.7 Each seller produces a single product that is vertically dieren-
tiated by quality. Upon making a purchase, the buyer evaluates the good according to the
following payo function:
q − t,
where q is the quality of the good produced and t is the transfer made to the seller.
Sellers choose whether to produce or not and at which quality level. The cost of produc-
ing a good with quality q is given by C (q, θ), where θ is the type of seller. We assume that
θ is drawn from a distribution with a c.d.f. given by F (θ) and support Θ. We allow F (·)
to be a piecewise continuous function with a nite set of discontinuity points; that is, F (·)
could be a mixture of a continuous and (nite) discrete distribution.
We make the following assumptions on the cost function:
Assumption 1. The function C (q; θ) satises Cq ≥ 0, Cθ ≤ 0, Cqq ≥ 0, and Cqθ ≤ 0.
Moreover, C (0, θ) = 0 and Cq (0, θ) = 0.
The submodularity assumption on C (·, ·), Cθq ≤ 0, ensures that it is ecient to have
higher θ’s to produce higher-quality goods; that is, higher values of θ have a lower marginal
cost of producing higher-quality goods. Finally, sellers’ payos are given by
t− C (q, θ) ,
where t is the transfer they receive.
For simplicity, we normalize the outside option of buyers and sellers to 0. In the rst
part of our analysis, we focus on the cases where all sellers produce. In section 6, we discuss
various assumptions about the entry of both buyers and sellers into the market.
We assume that buyers are uninformed about the quality of the product sold in the mar-
ket and have to rely on the information provided by an intermediary, who observes the
quality of the products sold by each seller and sends a partially informative signal to buy-
ers. This is represented by an information structure or experiment a la Blackwell (1953)
and is given by a signal space S and probability measure pi (·|q) ∈ ∆ (S). We refer to
this information structure (pi, S) as a rating system. One can interpret this assumption on
the information structure in multiple ways. One interpretation is that of a platform which
observes certain information about sellers’ past behavior and uses aggregated signals to
provide information to buyers. Another interpretation is that of a regulator who regulates
the information that can be used in contracts. Such regulations are fairly common in in-
surance markets. For example, community ratings in health insurance markets restrict the
extent to which insurance rates can vary across individuals.
7Alternatively, we can think of this as an economy with one seller and one buyer. While this setup is
mathematically equivalent to ours, the assumption of perfect competition is easier to interpret with a large
number of sellers and buyers.
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Given the information provided by the intermediary, buyers form expectations about
the quality of the goods in the market and compete over them. Since the only information
buyers observe about the products is the signal s ∈ S provided by the intermediary, there
is a price p (s) for each signal realization. In our baseline model, we assume that buyers
compete away their surplus and the price for each signal realization satises
p (s) = E [q|s] ,
where the conditional expectation is taken using a prior on the distribution of qualities
chosen by the seller and the signal structure by the intermediary. Thus, our assumption is
that buyers know the signal structure together with the strategies used by sellers in terms
of their quality choices.8
A seller of type θ that chooses a quality level q′ has the following payo:∫
S
p (s) pi (ds|q′)− C (q′, θ) ,
where
∫
S
p (s) pi (ds|q′) is the expected price received by the seller. In other words, sellers
must take into account the fact that upon choosing a quality, there will be a distribution
over the posteriors formed by buyers, which in turn aect the prices they face. Simply put,
sellers’ payos depend on their beliefs about buyers’ beliefs (i.e., their second-order beliefs).
Hence, given a rating system (pi, S), equilibrium quality choices {q (θ)}θ∈Θ by the sellers
must satisfy the following incentive compatibility constraint
q (θ) ∈ arg max
q′
∫
S
E [q|s] pi (ds|q′)− C (q′, θ) ; (1)
together with their participation constraint:
max
q′
∫
S
E [q|s] pi (ds|q′)− C (q′, θ) ≥ 0.
We dene a seller’s signaled quality as
q (θ) =
∫
S
E [q|s] pi (ds|q (θ)) . (2)
As an example, when signals are deterministic and pi (·|q) is degenerate, then signaled qual-
ity, q (θ), is the average quality among the sellers who send the same signal as θ. Signaled
qualities and their dependence on θ are the main determinants of the sellers’ incentives to
choose their desired level of quality.
The above denition of equilibrium for an arbitrary rating system or information struc-
ture claries the key dierence between our setting and that of the models of persuasion a
8In section 6 we consider alternative determination of prices. The zero surplus assumption for the buyers
is made out of convenience and not necessary for the analysis. What is necessary is that buyers’ surplus is
equated across signal realizations.
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la Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011). What dierentiates our setup from Bayesian persuasion
is the fact that due to moral hazard (i.e., q is a sellers’ choice) the state is endogenous to the
information structure. As we show in section 3, this endogeneity leads to incentive compat-
ibility (as it does in mechanism design) and characterization of second-order expectations.
We then use this characterization to describe the properties of optimal rating systems.
3 Characterization of General Rating Systems
In this section, we provide a characterization of the set of payos and qualities that can be
achieved in equilibrium by any rating system. The analysis sheds light on the restrictions
that are imposed by the particular way that incentives are provided via the rating system.
3.1 Discrete Distribution of Sellers’ Types
We start our analysis by rst assuming that the distribution of sellers’ types is discrete:
Θ = {θ1 < · · · < θN} and fi is the probability that a seller’s type is θi (we still refer to the
distribution θ as F ). As it is convenient to use a vector notation to describe allocations,
we describe the distribution of θ by its vector of point mass function f = (f1, · · · , fN).
Additionally, the vector of qualities and signaled qualities is given by q = (q1, · · · , qN) and
q = (q1, · · · , qN), respectively, where qi is the quality chosen by a seller of type θi and qi
is her signaled quality implied by the rating system. Throughout our analysis, vectors are
column vectors and are row vectors when they are transposed (e.g., q is a column vector
and qT is a row vector).
As we discuss below, the problem of characterizing the equilibrium payos and qualities
for arbitrary information structures boils down to the characterization of the set of possible
signaled qualities q for a given allocation of quality q. In what follows, we proceed towards
a full characterization of this set.
We rst establish that the main determinant of sellers’ incentives are signaled qualities,
q. To see this, note that since a seller of type θi can choose qj , then incentive compatibility
(1) implies that
qi − C (qi, θi) ≥ qj − C (qj, θi) ,∀j, i.
We can resort to an argument in the spirit of the revelation principle and use the above
inequalities in place of the constraint (1). This is mainly because we can always choose
a particular signal s∅ to be associated with o-path qualities together with buyers’ belief
that the quality associated with such a signal is 0.9 This would imply that by deviating to a
quality other than qj , prices will be 0. Therefore, the above constraint is equivalent to the
constraint in (1).
The following lemma characterizes standard incentive compatibility:
Lemma 1. If a vector of qualities, q, and a vector of signaled qualities, q, arise from an equi-
librium, then they must satisfy:
9Note that the o-path qualities and buyers’ belief are not pinned down for o-path values of qualities.
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qN ≥ · · · ≥ q1, qN ≥ · · · ≥ q1
qi−C (qi, θi) ≥ qj − C (qj, θi) , ∀i, j.
The proof is standard and is omitted.
Lemma (1) establishes that signaled qualities, qi’s, paired with chosen qualities, qi, must
be incentive compatible. A natural question then arises: Does the fact that qi’s are derived
from second-order expectations in (2) impose any restrictions on them? In what follows,
we show that the fact that signaled qualities are derived from second-order expectations for
an arbitrary rating system is equivalent to second-order stochastic dominance. That is, it
is equivalent to the random variable implied by qi distributed according to F dominating
the random variable induced by qi distributed according to F in the sense of second-order
stochastic dominance.
In formulating second-order stochastic dominance, we use an alternative to the familiar
formulation of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). In particular, we use the majorization formu-
lation of second-order stochastic dominance, which, as we show later, allows us to provide
a sharp characterization of rating systems that induces a certain distribution of signaled
qualities. Our approach is based on the majorization ranking introduced by Hardy et al.
(1934). See Marshall et al. (1979) for a thorough treatment of the concept.
More specically, consider two random variables, x and y, that take on real values in
{x1 ≤ · · · ≤ xN} and {y1 ≤ · · · ≤ yN}, respectively, and whose distribution is given by
Pr (x = xi) = Pr (y = yi) = fi. We say that y <F x or x is F -majorized by y if the fol-
lowing holds:
N∑
i=1
fixi =
N∑
i=1
fiyi,
i∑
j=1
fjxj ≥
i∑
j=1
fjyj,∀i = 1, · · · , N − 1. (3)
Hardy et al. (1929) showed that the above is equivalent to
∑N
i=1 fiu (xi) ≥
∑N
i=1 fiu (yi) for
any concave function u (·); that is, it is equivalent to the standard second-order stochastic
dominance. As it will be clear later, we prefer this formulation of second-order stochastic
dominance, since it informs us of the properties of rating systems. We follow Hardy et al.
(1929) and refer to the inequalities in (3) as majorization inequalities.
In order to describe the properties of q and q, we follow Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)
and represent the rating system (pi, S) as a distribution over the distribution of posteriors,
τ ∈ ∆ (∆ (Θ)) that satises the Bayes plausibility constraint, which can be written in vector
form as
f =
∫
∆(Θ)
µdτ,
where µ is the posterior over types – represented as a vector in RN . If a rating system
generates a nite number of signals, then τ must have a nite support and we can construct
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a signal structure from τ using Bayes’ rule:10
∀µ ∈ Supp (τ) , pi ({s} |qi) fi
µsi
= τ ({µs}) ,
where s is the signal associated with the posterior µs. We can thus use the above to formu-
late the signaled qualities as a function of actual qualities:
qi =
∑
s
pi ({s} |qi)
∑
j pi ({s} |qj) fjqj∑
j pi ({s} |qj) fj
=
1
fi
∫
µ∈Supp(τ)
µiµ
Tqdτ (4)
where µT is the transpose of µ, and µTq is the inner product of µT and q. In other words,
µTq is the posterior mean of quality, and the above integral is the expectation of the pos-
terior mean quality from the perspective of the seller. One can write (4) in vector form as
q = Aq where A is an N ×N positive matrix which satises
fTA = fT ,Ae = e, (5)
where e = (1, · · · , 1)T .11 The existence ofAwhich satises (5) implies the following result:
Proposition 1. Let q,q be vectors of signaled and true qualities, respectively, that arise in an
equilibrium for some information structure. Then, q <F q.
The proof is relegated to the appendix.
That q F -majorizes q is a direct result of existence of matrixA that satises (5). Loosely
speaking, (5) implies that qi’s are less dispersed than qi and thus q <F q. Our main charac-
terization result in this section is that the reverse of Proposition 1 holds as well:
Theorem 1. Consider the vectors of signaled and true qualities, q,q, respectively, and suppose
that they satisfy
q1 ≤ · · · ≤ qN , q1 ≤ · · · ≤ qN
with equality in one implying the other. Moreover, suppose that q <F q. Then there exists a
rating system (pi, S) so that
qi = E [E [q|s] |qi] .
The formal proof of Theorem 1 is relegated to the appendix. Here, we provide an outline.
Consider the set of all signaled quality vectors that are induced by some rating system:
S =
{
r|∃τ ∈ ∆ (∆ (Θ)) , r = diag (f)−1
∫
µµTdτq with f =
∫
µdτ
}
. (6)
The set S is convex since for any two measures τ1 and τ2 that satisfy f =
∫
µdτi, i.e., Bayes
plausibility, their convex combination also satises Bayes plausibility. This together with
10Since θ is a discrete random variable with nitely many values, it is without loss of generality to focus on
rating systems with nitely many signals.
11We formally show this in Lemma 2 in the Appendix.
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the fact that
∫
µµTdτ is linear in τ implies that S is convex. Now consider q <F q. In order
to show that q ∈ S , we show that for every vector λ ∈ RN , there exists r ∈ S such that
λT r ≥ λTq. Since this would also be true for −λ, along any directions one can nd two
members of λTS that are on either side of λTq on the real line. This observation together
with the separating hyperplane theorem implies that q ∈ S.
In order to show the inequality λT r ≥ λTq, we proceed by induction. When N = 2,
the proof is straightforward. The denition (3) in this case implies that q2 − q1 ≤ q2 − q1
(Figure 1). Since fTq = fTq, then q must lie on a line connecting q to
(
fTq
)
e, i.e., signaled
qualities associated with no information. This implies our claim is true.
For N > 2, we show that the inequality either holds for full information or that it is
possible to pull two consecutive states, focusing on rating systems that do not distinguish
between states i and i+ 1, and reduce the number of states to N − 1. We can then use the
induction assumption, which proves our claim is true.
Figure 1: Depiction of q satisfying (3) when N = 2.
It is worth comparing our main characterization result to those of other papers in the lit-
erature on Bayesian persuasion. A strand of that literature has considered a class of sender-
receiver problems in which the receiver’s action depends on her posterior expectations.
For example, Gentzkow and Kamenica (2016), Kolotilin (2018), and Dworczak and Martini
(2019) use a version of Blackwell’s result (Blackwell (1953)12) and show that the posterior
mean is a random variable that second-order stochastically dominates the state. They then
use techniques from linear programming or optimization with stochastic dominance con-
straints to solve the problem. Our work is dierent from theirs in two respects: First, since
we have to respect sellers’ (i.e., senders’) incentives, our variable of interest is the second-
order expectation of the sender about the receiver’s observed posterior. Second, we use
12A generalization of this is Strassen’s theorem; see Theorem 7.A.1 in Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007)
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a dierent formulation of the stochastic dominance relationship that is informative of the
signal structure, as we illustrate below.
The above theorem can be used to provide a full characterization of the set of quali-
ties and payos that arise from the equilibrium dened above, which is summarized in the
following corollary:
Corollary 1. The vectors of signaled qualities q and qualities q arise in equilibrium if and
only if the following are satised:
q <F q
qi − C (qi, θi) ≥ qj − C (qj, θi) ,∀i, j.
3.2 General Distribution of Seller Types
In this section, we extend our analysis to allow for the general distribution of types. Let
F (θ) be a cumulative distribution function that has nitely many discontinuities. For any
two increasing functions q (θ) and q (θ) representing signaled and true quality, respectively,
we say q <F q if the following holds:∫ θ
θ
q (θ′) dF (θ′) ≥
∫ θ
θ
q (θ′) dF (θ′) ,∀θ ∈ [θ, θ] (7)∫ θ
θ
q (θ) dF (θ) =
∫ θ¯
θ
q (θ) dF (θ) . (8)
When q (θ) and q (θ) are continuous, one implication of majorization is that for low values
of θ, q (θ) ≥ q (θ), while for higher values of θ, q (θ) ≥ q (θ). Using this denition of
F -majorization, we can show the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Let q (θ) and q (θ) be two functions representing signaled and true quality,
respectively. Then, these functions arise from an equilibrium for some rating system if and
only if they satisfy the following:
1. The prot function Π (θ) = q (θ)−C (q (θ) , θ) is continuous for all θ. When its deriva-
tives exist, it satises
Π′ (θ) = −Cθ (q (θ) , θ) . (9)
2. The functions q (θ) and q (θ) are increasing in θ and satisfy q <F q.
We prove this proposition by considering the joint distribution of the posterior mean
E [q|s] and q (θ). We approximate the distribution of F (·) with a sequence of discrete dis-
tributions whose supports are ordered according to the subset order, i.e., they are a ltration.
We can apply the result of theorem 1 to construct an information structure associated with
this discrete approximation. By compactness of the space of measures over the posterior
mean and q (θ), these information structures must have a convergent subsequence with a
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limiting information structure. It thus remains to be shown that the expectation of the pos-
terior mean conditional on q (θ) under this limiting information structure coincides with
q (θ). To show that, we resort to the martingale convergence theorem. In particular, given
our construction of the discrete distributions, the support of such distributions can be used
to construct a ltration. This ltration and the realization of q (θ) and posterior mean form
a bounded martingale. As a result, we can apply Doob’s martingale convergence theorem to
show that the posterior mean conditional on q (θ) under the limiting information structure
coincides with q (θ). We formalize this argument in the appendix.
The conditions in Proposition 2 represent the incentive compatibility (9) and majoriza-
tion. Incentive compatibility implies that the surplus function is continuous. However, it
is possible that qualities (signaled and true) exhibit discontinuities. This implies that such
discontinuities must occur at the same points and in such a way that Π (θ) is continuous.
3.3 Separating Rating Systems
While the above result fully characterizes the set of payos and allocations, it is not infor-
mative about the rating systems that implement a given pair of signaled and true quality
functions, q (θ) and q (θ). In this section, we describe what the majorization constraints im-
ply about the rating systems that implement certain payos. While in general it is dicult
to provide a full characterization of the rating systems that implement a certain pair of sig-
naled and true quality, it is possible to provide a partial characterization of their properties.
Our rst result describes when dierent sets of qualities must be separated by rating
systems. We say a rating system (pi, S) is separating at qˆ if the set of signals generated by
the types with q (θ) ≤ qˆ is dierent from that generated by the types with q (θ) > qˆ almost
surely. Formally, if we dene the set of signals generated by the types below and above θˆ as
follows:
S1 =
⋃
θ:q(θ)≤qˆ
Supp (pi (·|q (θ))) , S2 =
⋃
θ:q(θ)>qˆ
Supp (pi (·|q (θ))) ,
then (pi, S) is separating at qˆ if∫
Θ
pi (S1 ∩ S2|q (θ)) dF (θ) = 0.
The following proposition states the condition under which a signal is separating at qˆ:
Proposition 3. Let q (θ) and q (θ) be a pair of signaled and true quality functions that satisfy
the conditions in Proposition 2. Let (pi, S) be a rating system for which q (θ) = E [E [q|s] |q (θ)].
Then (pi, S) is separating at qˆ if and only if the majorization inequality (7) binds at θˆ =
max{θ:q(θ)=qˆ} θ.
The proof is relegated to the appendix.
When (pi, S) is separating at qˆ, then when receiving a signal that belongs to qualities
below qˆ, a buyer is certain that the type she faces is below θˆ. Therefore, standard Bayes
plausibility implies that the expectation of signaled qualities and true qualities conditional
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Figure 2: Full mixing ratings and their associated signaled quality
on types being below θˆ must be equal. The reverse statement can be shown by considering
the inequalities in the proof of Proposition 1. This implies that for a given pair of q (·) and
q (·) functions, a rst step of identifying the rating system that delivers such qualities and
signaled qualities is to identify the points at which the majorization constraint is binding.
The following illustrates one example where majorization is always slack.
Example. Full Mixing Rating Systems. Suppose that q (θ) and q (θ) are both contin-
uous, increasing, and satisfy q <F q. Furthermore, suppose that there exist a unique θˆ for
which q
(
θˆ
)
= q
(
θˆ
)
. This together with majorization implies that for values of θ < θˆ,
q (θ) > q (θ) holds, while for values of θ > θˆ, q (θ) < q (θ) must hold. Moreover, it im-
plies that the majorization inequality (7) never binds for values of θ < θ. Let us dene the
function α (θ) as follows:
q (θ) = α (θ) q (θ) + (1− α (θ)) q
(
θˆ
)
.
Given our assumption on q and q, α (θ) ∈ [0, 1]. This implies that a signal that reveals the
quality with probability α (θ) and reveals nothing (sends a generic signal) with probability
1 − α (θ) can implement the signaled quality function q (θ). Figure 2 depicts the signaled
qualities in this example. Since q (·) and q (·) intersect only once, the value of α is between
0 and 1 and therefore well-dened. We refer to such rating systems as full mixing.
The above example illustrates the property that when the majorization constraint does
not bind (in the interior of Θ) some pooling of signals is required; in this case, it is an extreme
form as all types send the generic signal with a positive probability. As we will show, full
mixing rating systems are a key feature of Pareto optimal rating systems.
Construction of Rating Systems While in general characterizing properties rating sys-
tems from a signaled qualities prole is dicult, we provide an algorithm to construct the
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rating system based on quality and signaled quality proles – see Appendix . This algo-
rithm generates a rating system when the type space is discrete. Moreover, it shows that
a repeated application of a small class of rating systems – those that simply pool qualities
together – can always implement a vector of signaled qualities.
4 Pareto-optimal Rating Systems
The results in the previous section provide a full characterization of the set of payos and
qualities that can arise in equilibrium under an arbitrary rating system. In this section, we
use this characterization to derive the properties of an optimal rating system given dierent
objectives. Our focus will be on the set of Pareto-optimal allocations, i.e., those that maxi-
mize a weighted average of sellers’ surplus. In Section 6, we consider alternative objectives,
such as the revenue of the intermediary that charges a at fee. Throughout the rest of our
analysis, we assume that F (·) is continuous in θ.
The class of objectives that we consider is given by the following expression:∫ θ
θ
λ (θ) Π (θ) dF (θ) . (10)
In the above Π (θ) is the payo of a seller of type θ, while λ (θ) is the welfare weight of
sellers of dierent types; without loss of generality, we set
∫ θ
θ
λ (θ) dF = 1. We consider a
few cases for this objective in order to convey the main insight of optimal rating design: (1)
total prots, i.e., λ (θ) = 1, ∀θ; (2) low-quality optimal, i.e., λ (θ) decreasing in θ; (3) high-
quality optimal, i.e., λ (θ) strictly increasing in θ; and (4) mid-quality optimal, i.e., λ (θ)
strictly increasing for θ < θ∗ and strictly decreasing for θ > θ∗.
Hence, the problem of Pareto-optimal rating design is to maximize the objective in (10)
subject to incentive compatibility (as described in Proposition 2) and majorization con-
straints (7) and (8). This problem is not a convex programming problem, i.e., the constraint
set is not convex mainly due to the presence of majorization and incentive constraints.13 As
a result, standard Lagrangian methods cannot be used. In what follows, we use perturbation
arguments to prove our results.
4.1 Total Prots
In order to characterize optimal rating systems, it is useful to start from the rst best bench-
mark, the one in which total prots is maximized. In the unconstrained optimum, ignoring
the fact that θ is unobservable and that incentives are provided via rating systems, qualities
must satisfy
Cq
(
qFB (θ) , θ
)
= 1.
13As shown by Guesnerie and Laont (1984), it is possible to make assumptions about the cost function
and transform variables in order to make the set implied by the incentive constraints convex. However, under
such transformation, the majorization constraint becomes non-convex.
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Letting signaled quality be dened by q (θ) = q (θ), it is straightforward to see that the
pair (q, q) is incentive compatible and satises q <F q. Moreover, since the majorization
inequality (7) binds for all θ’s, it implies that q should be implemented with an information
system that fully reveals sellers’ qualities. We use this simple benchmark as a point of
comparison against other Pareto-optimal allocations.
4.2 Low-quality Optimal Ratings
To characterize low-quality-optimal rating systems, it is useful to consider the standard
mechanism design problem in which there are no restrictions on q (·): one in which q (·)’s
are interpreted as monetary payments. In this case, the problem of solving for the optimal
mechanism is similar to the familiar mechanism design problem such as that considered
by Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Baron and Myerson (1982), among others. Thus, similar
techniques can be used to solve this relaxed version of the problem.
This relaxed mechanism design problem is given by
max
∫
λ (θ) Π (θ) dF (θ) (P)
subject to
Π (θ) ≥ 0
Π′ (θ) = −Cθ (q (θ) , θ)
q (θ) : increasing∫ θ
θ
Π (θ) dF (θ) =
∫ θ
θ
[q (θ)− C (q (θ) , θ)] dF (θ) .
The solution can be found using standard techniques of solving mechanism design problems,
as for example those described by Myerson (1981). In particular, there are two possibilities:
(1) the cost function, C (·, ·), and distribution, F (·), are such that the monotonicity con-
straint on q (θ) is slack, and (2) the monotonicity constraint sometimes binds. In the rst
case, it is straightforward to show that q (θ) must satisfy
1 = Cq (q (θ) , θ)− Cθq (q (θ) , θ)
[
1− F (θ)− ∫ θ
θ
λ (θ′) dF (θ′)
f (θ)
]
. (11)
Since λ (θ) is decreasing, the above implies that Cq ≤ 1 since Cθq ≤ 0. If q (θ) and q (θ) are
dierentiable, we must have that
q′ (θ) = Cq (q (θ) , θ) q′ (θ) ≤ q′ (θ) .
Therefore, signaled qualities are atter than actual qualities. The equality of the average
value of signaled qualities and that of true qualities implies that the majorization inequality
(7) is always satised. In other words, the optimal rating system is full mixing – see section
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3.3. When the monotonicity constraint binds, Myerson (1981)’s ironing procedure can be
used to nd the optimal qualities. In that solution, either q (θ) is constant or it satises
(11). Therefore, a similar argument can be used to show that the majorization inequality is
always satised.
We thus have the following proposition:
Proposition 4. A quality allocation q (θ) is low-quality-optimal if and only if it is a solution
to the relaxed problem (P). Moreover, if the cost function C (·, ·) is strictly submodular, then a
low-quality-optimal rating system is full mixing.
The proof is relegated to the appendix.
Intuitively, in low-quality-optimal allocation, the goal is to reduce high-quality sellers’
surplus as much as possible while at the same time respecting incentive compatibility. The
existence of information rents arising from incentive compatibility implies that quality pro-
vision is always lower than that of the rst best, i.e., Cq ≤ 1 has to hold. Moreover, as
(11) establishes, when C (·, ·) is strictly submodular, Cq < 1, so some degree of pooling is
required in order to increase low-quality sellers’ surplus.
4.3 High-quality Optimal Ratings
In this section, we discuss the properties of optimal rating systems when the Pareto weight
of higher-quality sellers is higher. As in section 4.2, we can again consider the relaxed
mechanism design problem without the majorization constraint. Since λ (θ) is increasing,
the same argument as in section 4.2 shows that the solution to the relaxed problem (i.e.,
when the monotonicity constraint is slack) should satisfy Cq > 1. This, combined with
the incentive constraint, implies that q (·) will be steeper than q (θ) as a function of θ, and
thus violates the majorization constraint. Intuitively, when λ (θ) is increasing, it is optimal
to allocate prots to higher-quality sellers. However, since this is not incentive compati-
ble, optimal allocations involve the overprovision of quality in order to make allocations
incentive compatible, but this cannot be achieved, as our result in section 3 implies. Intu-
itively hiding any information will not help high-quality sellers as they will be mixed with
low-quality sellers and thus get lower prices in equilibrium. Furthermore, given that all
information is revealed, rst best allocations are optimal.
The following proposition establishes that high-quality-seller–optimal rating systems
must be fully revealing:
Proposition 5. A quality allocation is high-quality optimal if and only if it satises q (θ) =
qFB (θ). Moreover, a high-quality optimal rating system is fully revealing.
For a fully revealing rating system, the majorization constraint always binds. The proof
of this proposition involves coming up with perturbations of an allocation for which ma-
jorization is slack and therefore reaching a contradiction with the optimality.
18
In particular, in order to prove Proposition 5, we focus on a relaxed version of the prob-
lem, where we only impose incentive compatibility as
Π (θ)− Π (θ) ≤ −
∫ θ
θ
Cθ (q (θ
′) , θ′) dθ′. (12)
When the above inequality binds for all values of θ, it becomes equivalent to the incentive
compatibility constraint. 14We show that the solution of this relaxed problem is the rst best
allocation and thus at the solution this inequality binds.
Suppose that the majorization constraint is slack on an interval. Then, two properties
have to be true for any such interval:
1. It must be that over this intervalCq (q (θ) , θ) ≥ 1. To see that, suppose to the contrary
that for a subinterval I , Cq (q (θ) , θ) < 1. Then, one can consider a perturbation of
q (θ) over such a subinterval that increases q (θ), given by δq (θ). Additionally, we
perturb q (·) as follows:
δq (θ) =
{
Cq (q (θ) , θ) δq (θ) +
∫
I
[1− Cq (q (θ) , θ)] δq (θ) dF (θ) θ ∈ I∫
I
[1− Cq (q (θ) , θ)] δq (θ) dF (θ) . θ /∈ I
This perturbation increases q (θ) for the θ’s in I , compensates these types for their
cost increase, and since Cq < 1, allocates the extra surplus generated by this pertur-
bation across all types. Under this perturbation, δΠ (θ) = δΠ (θ) for all values of θ
(Figure 3).
The perturbation increases some values of q (θ) and leaves the rest unchanged, and
Cθq ≤ 0, so it does not violate (12). As majorization is slack over this interval, it is
always possible to make δq (θ) small enough so that it holds under the perturbed allo-
cation. Therefore, this perturbation increases prots and satises all the constraints.
2. Over this interval, the incentive constraint (12) is binding. If not, it is possible to take
subinterval I , increase Π (θ) for high values of θ, and decrease Π (θ) for low values
of θ without violating the incentive constraint. This is possible because the majoriza-
tion inequalities are slack over I . Since λ (θ)’s are increasing, this only increases the
objective. Thus, at the optimum, the incentive constraint is binding.
It is fairly straightforward to show that the above properties are in contradiction with a
slack majorization constraint. In particular, since over this intervalCq ≥ 1 and the incentive
constraint is binding, then it must be that q (·) is steeper than q (·). Hence, majorization will
be violated and the claim is proven. We formalize this argument in the appendix.
14Note that the inequality in (12) is derived from integrating the envelope condition when sellers are re-
stricted to lie upward, i.e., when they can only pretend to be of a higher type. It is thus similar to restricting
attention to upward incentive constraints in an environment with discrete types. That these constraints are
the relevant ones here is natural since the objective is to allocate prots to higher-quality sellers.
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Figure 3: Perturbation of qualities and signaled qualities when Cq (θ) < 1 and majorization
is slack. The graph of q (·) is shifted up by ∫
I
(1− Cq) δqdF > 0.
The above result points toward a force opposite to that discussed in section 4.2. That is,
a rating system is unable to reallocate prots to higher-quality sellers. In particular, when
the objective calls for reallocating prots to higher-quality sellers, the best that can be done
is to reveal all information. This would imply that the quality allocation coincides with the
rst best. In the next section, we show that this insight holds also for other objectives.
4.4 Mid-quality Optimal Ratings
In this section, we illustrate the insight from section 4.3 that when prots must be allocated
to sellers with higher quality – in this case mid-quality sellers – then optimal rating systems
must involve revealing information. In particular, we assume that there exists θ∗ for which
λ (θ) is strictly increasing in θwhen θ ≤ θ∗ and λ (θ) is strictly decreasing in θwhen θ ≥ θ∗.
The following proposition characterizes optimal rating systems:
Proposition 6. Suppose that λ (θ) is hump-shaped. Then there exists θˆ ≤ θ˜ < θ∗ such that
for all values of θ ≤ θˆ, q (θ) = qFB (θ); for all values of θ ∈
[
θˆ, θ˜
)
, q (θ) = qFB
(
θˆ
)
; while it
is full mixing for values of q above q
(
θ˜
)
.
Figure 4 depicts the structure of the optimal rating system described in proposition 6. As
it can be seen, when the objective values the prots of medium-quality sellers, it is always
optimal to hide some information about high-quality sellers. In particular, by creating un-
certainty about middle- and high-quality types, the rating system can deliver higher prots
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to mid-quality types. For low-quality sellers, as in the case discussed in section 4.3, the
rating system is fully revealing. Additionally, a possible element of mid-quality optimal al-
locations is bunching of types. This occurs mainly because at θ˜, the optimal level of prot
could be less than the rst best – since this allows the allocation to push prots to higher
quality sellers. This feature combined with the fact that majorization is binding below θ˜
implies that there must be bunching of types.
Figure 4: Mid-quality optimal ratings. The left panel depicts the position of the full revela-
tion and bunching cuto; the right panel depicts optimal qualities and signaled qualities.
The resulting rating system reveals all information for low qualities; reveals only that
q ∈
[
q
(
θˆ
)
, q
(
θ˜+
))
, and is a full mixing rating system when q ≥ q
(
θ˜+
)
– q (θ+) is the
right limit of q (θ′) as θ′ approaches θ.
Our proof of Proposition 6 involves elements that are similar to the perturbation argu-
ment in the proof of Proposition 5. In particular, we rst focus on a more relaxed version of
the problem, one in which for values of θ ≤ θ∗, the inequality (12) must be satised, while
for values of θ ≥ θ∗, the inequality
Π
(
θ
)− Π (θ) ≥ −∫ θ
θ
Cθ (q (θ
′) , θ′) dθ′ (13)
must be satised; we will then show that both sets of inequality must bind at the optimum
and thus the solution of the relaxed problem coincides with that of the main problem. How-
ever, our perturbations allow the inequalities to be relaxed. 15
In this relaxed version of the problem, we are able to show that if the majorization
constraint binds for some θ′ < θ∗, then it must bind for all values of θ ≤ θ′. To do this, we
use the same perturbations discussed in section 4.3.
15Similar to inequality (12), (13) is derived from integrating the envelope condition between θ and θ when
sellers can only lie downward.
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For values of θ > θ∗, we can show that the majorization constraint never binds. We
demonstrate that for values of θ > θ∗, Cq (q (θ) , θ) ≤ 1. Otherwise, a perturbation that
reduces quality increases the objective and keeps majorization satised. Moreover, for all
values of θ > θ∗, (13) must bind, which implies that Π (θ) must be continuous. We then
show that if majorization is to bind at some θ > θ′ > θ∗, then Cq (q (θ′) , θ′) > 1, which is
a contradiction.
An interesting observation is that even though the objective puts the highest weight
on sellers of type θ∗, the rating system combines the types below θ∗ with those above it,
i.e., θ˜ < θ∗, because of the incentive constraint. In particular, if one solves for the optimal
rating system when θ is restricted to be in
[
θ∗, θ
]
, at the optimum q (θ∗) = qFB (θ∗) while
q (θ∗) > q (θ∗). In other words, the surplus generated by type θ∗ is higher than in the rst
best. As a result, continuity of Π (θ) cannot hold since its value is at most equal to the rst
best.
Finally, an optimal rating system must necessarily create a jump in qualities. That is,
it should be designed in a way that no one chooses qualities in
[
q
(
θ˜−
)
, q
(
θ˜
)]
. This
is because for sellers below θ˜ the allocations are fully revealing, while the rating system
partially pools sellers above θ˜ with higher types. For payos to be continuous, as implied
by the incentive compatibility, allocations must exhibit a jump.
In summary, our results in this section highlight the main trade-os in reallocating prof-
its using rating systems. On the one hand, when prots should be allocated from lower-
quality to higher-quality types of sellers, the rating system must reveal all information. On
the other hand, when the opposite should occur, the rating system must be partially reveal-
ing. One can use this as a general guide in designing a rating system.
We should note that while the immediate interpretation of the analysis here is that of
characterizing the Pareto frontier of this environment, one can interpret the Pareto weights
as arising from heterogeneous outside options – see Jullien (2000) for an analysis of this
problem – where λ (θ)’s are associated with tightness of the participation constraints.16
While equivalent to our problem, the problem of analyzing the solution with heterogeneous
outside options is much less tractable. While it is not possible to show, one can associate
higher outside option loosely with higher welfare weights. Under this admittedly loose
interpretation, our analysis provides a connection between design of rating systems and
the side of the market where entry conditions are tighter, i.e., what is sometimes referred to
as shorter side of the market. According to our analysis, when high quality sellers are the
shorter side of the market, then ratings should reveal all information in order to relax their
entry. If this occurs for mid- or low-quality sellers, optimal rating systems must involve
some mixing.
16In Dworczak et al. (forthcoming), agents are heterogeneous in their marginal value of money and the λ’s
represent this heterogeneity.
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5 Optimal Ratings with Random Quality Outcomes
The model used in the previous section assumes that sellers can precisely choose their level
of quality. However, often, sellers may not be able to make such a precise choice. For
example, two sided platforms often use measures of quality that are not fully controlled by
the service provider. These platforms often rely on buyers’ feedback which could be subject
to randomness: an eBay seller can be subject to shipment delays that are not fully controlled
by her; an Airbnb host can be matched with an overcritical guest, etc. In this section, we
allow for random quality outcomes. As we will show, while the optimal rating systems are
deterministic partitions, they share some similarities to those derived in section 4.
Consider the model in section 2 and suppose that when a seller chooses q, the realized
quality is given by x, where x is random. Without loss of generality, assume that q, x ∈
[0, 1]. We denote the distribution (p.d.f) of x conditional on choice of q by g (x|q) while its
cumulative distribution is G (x|q). As in 2, the sellers can be of dierent types θ and the
cost of choosing q is given by C (q, θ) which satises Assumption 1. We make the following
assumptions on g (x|q):
Assumption 2. The distribution function g (x|q) satises:
1. Average value of x is q, i.e.,
∫ 1
0
xg (x|q) dx = q.
2. The distribution function g (x|q) is continuously dierentiable with respect to x and q
for all values of x ∈ [0, 1] and q ∈ (0, 1).
3. The distribution function g (x|q) satises full support, i.e., g (x|q) > 0, ∀x ∈ (0, 1) and
monotone likelihood ratio, i.e., gq (x|q) /q (x|q) is strictly increasing in x.
The rst part of this assumption is a normalization of the mean of x.17 The second part is
a dierentiability assumption and is made so that we can use standard results from calculus
of variation. The third part of the assumption implies that one cannot back out the chosen
q by an observation of x and that the likelihood ratio gq/g is increasing. The latter implies
that an increase in q shifts the distribution of x to the right, i.e., increases the distribution
of x in the sense of rst-order stochastic dominance.
As in section 2, we assume that the intermediary observes the quality experienced by the
buyers x and designs a rating system represented by (S, pi) where pi (s|x) is the distribution
of signals conditional on the realization of quality x. As before, prices are given by buyers’
posterior beliefs and expected prices for each realization of quality x are given by
x (x) =
∫
E [x|s] pi (ds|x) .
17More generally one can think of an action a ∈ R that controls the distribution of quality outcomes. As
long as the average value of the outcome is a concave and increasing function of a, the normalization in part
1 of Assumption 2 is without loss of generality.
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We impose that x (x) must be increasing in x.18 Recall that, in the deterministic case, in-
centive compatibility implies the monotonicity of the signaled qualities. This assumption is
also a realistic one as leading examples of rating and certication typically exhibit monotone
signals.19
Similar to the model with deterministic qualities, a characterization result as in The-
orem 1 and Proposition 2 should hold here. However, the denition of majorization now
depends on the distribution of x. For an average quality prole {q (θ)}θ∈Θ, the (cumulative)
distribution of x is given by
H (x) =
∫
Θ
∫ x
0
g (x′|q (θ)) dx′dF (θ)
We can, thus, say that x 4H x if and only if it satises
∫ x
0
[x (x′)− x′] dH (x′) ≥ 0 and∫ 1
0
[x (x)− x] dH (x) = 0.
Given a rating system and the signaled qualities it induces, i.e., the function x (x), sellers
choose q optimally and the choice of average quality by the seller of type θ, q (θ) must satisfy
the following incentive compatibility
q (θ) ∈ arg max
q∈[0,1]
∫ 1
0
x (x) g (x|q) dx− C (q, θ) (14)
In order to simplify the problem of optimal rating design, we replace the above incentive
constraint with its local version
Cq (q (θ) , θ) =
∫ 1
0
x (x) gq (x|q (θ)) dx (15)
The above constraint replaces incentive compatibility with its rst order condition. When
this constraint is sucient, we say rst-order approach is valid. We derive all of our results
under the assumption that rst-order approach is valid.
Given the formulation of majorization and incentive compatibility, the problem of nd-
ing a Pareto optimal rating system is then to choose q (θ) and x (·) to maximize a weighted
average of sellers’ payos
∫
Θ
λ (θ) Π (θ) dF (θ) subject to the local incentive constraint 15
and x <H x.
5.1 Optimality of Monotone Partitions
In this subsection, we show that optimal signal when the quality provision is random can
be obtained within monotone partitions in which in each partition, we either fully reveal
all information about x or we just inform the buyer that the sellers’ quality is within the
partition.
18This is partly because we do not know if our characterization result in section 3 applies absent this mono-
tonicity assumption.
19The incentive compatibility constraint (14) implies that
∫ 1
0
x (x) g (x|q (θ)) dx and q (θ) must be increas-
ing in θ. Under Assumption 2, this is satised when x (·) is monotone increasing.
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Figure 5: Signaled qualities for a monotone partition rating system.
Let us formally dene our notion of deterministic monotone partitions. A rating system
(S, pi) is called a monotone partition if there exists a partition of [0, 1] to a collection of sets
{Iα}α∈A where: 1. each Iα is either a closed or half-open interval of the form [x1, x2), 2.
for all α, β ∈ A, Iα and Iβ are ranked, i.e., either min Iα ≥ sup Iβ or min Iβ ≥ sup Iα,
3. For each α ∈ A there exists a unique signal sα ∈ S such that pi ({sα} |x) = 1 for all
x ∈ Iα. In words, a monotone partition either fully reveals each value of quality (in which
case Iα is a singleton) or pools it with an interval around it. Note that the signaled qualities
x (x) associated with a monotone partition rating system is always of the form depicted in
Figure 5. The points at which the majorization constraints are binding create the partition
Iα wherein between any two such points x (x) is constant and equal to the mean value of
x conditional on x belonging to such an interval.20
The following proposition establishes that all optimal rating systems must be monotone
partitions:
Proposition 7. Suppose that the rst order approach is valid and Assumption 2 holds. Then
a Pareto optimal rating system is a monotone partition.
Proof. We show the claim by rst showing that for all x, either the monotonicity constraint
is binding or the majorization constraint is binding at the optimum. Suppose to the contrary
that this does not hold. Note that a change in x (x) for a measure zero of x’s, does not aect
the objective, and the majorization constraint. This implies that in order to achieve a con-
tradiction, we need to rule out an interval in which neither majorization nor monotonicity
20The assumption that Iα’s are half-open intervals implies that x (·) is right continuous. This is without
loss of generality as the distribution of x does not have atoms.
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constraint is binding. Suppose that there exists an interval I = [x1, x2] for which majoriza-
tion and monotonicity are slack. Note that under the validity of the rst order approach,
the optimal rating system must be a solution to the following planning problem:
max
q(·),x(·)
∫
Θ
λ (θ)
[∫ 1
0
x (x) g (x|q (θ)) dx− C (q (θ) , θ)
]
dF (θ) (P1)
subject to ∫ 1
0
x (x) gq (x|q (θ)) dx = Cq (q (θ) , θ)∫ x
0
[x (x′)− x′]
∫
Θ
g (x′|q (θ)) dF (θ) dx′ ≥ 0∫ 1
0
[x (x)− x]
∫
Θ
g (x|q (θ)) dF (θ) dx = 0
x (x)− x (x′) ≥ 0,∀x ≥ x′
By combining the Theorems 1 in section 9.3 and 9.4 of Luenberger (1997), there must exist
lagrange multipliers γ (θ) – for the incentive compatibility constraint, and a positive la-
grange multiplier M (x) associated with the majorization constraint and m– the lagrange
multiplier associated with the last constraint together with η (x, x′) ≥ 0 for the monotonic-
ity constraint.
The optimality condition for values of x ∈ I are given by∫
Θ
λ (θ) g (x|q (θ)) dF (θ) +
∫
Θ
γ (θ) gq (x|q (θ)) dθ
+
∫ 1
x
M (x′) dx′
∫
Θ
g (x|q (θ)) dF (θ)
+m
∫
Θ
g (x|q (θ)) dF (θ) = 0 (16)
Moreover, since by assumption the majorization constraint is slack for x ∈ I , µ (x) =∫ 1
x
M (x′) dx′ is constant for all x ∈ I . We can write the above as∫
Θ
(λ (θ) + µ (x1) +m) g (x|q (θ)) dF (θ) +
∫
Θ
γ (θ) gq (x|q (θ)) dx = 0,∀x ∈ I (17)
Let xˆ (x) be dened as
xˆ (x) =
{
x (x) x /∈ I∫
I x(x)dH(x)∫
I dH(x)
x ∈ I
Note that x <H xˆ and therefore, by transitivity of majorization x <H xˆ. Since xˆ (·) and
x (·) only dier on I and (17) holds, the value of lagrangian is the same for xˆ and x. Thus,
we can replace x with a signaled quality function for which monotincity is binding for I .
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Finally, note that sincex (·) is a bounded function, ∫ x
0
[x (x′)− x′] ∫
Θ
g (x′|q (θ)) dx′dF (θ)
is a continuous function. Hence, the points at which it takes a positive value is an open sub-
set of [0, 1]. Thus, it is union of disjoint intervals. For values of x belonging to any of the
intervals, the monotonicity constraint must be binding – by the previous step. Hence, x (·)
is constant for any interval where majorization is slack. Additionally, the points at which
the majorization constraint is binding is a closed subset of [0, 1] and thus it is a union of
disjoint closed intervals (possibility isolated points). Over any such interval, taking deriva-
tive of the binding majorization constraint with respect to x implies that x (x) = x. This
establishes the claim.
The above proposition implies that when quality outcomes are random, one does not
need rating systems with random signals – as in section 4 – to provide incentives. Unlike
in the deterministic model of section 4, deterministic monotone partitions do not lead to
bunching of types. This is due to the fact that the realization of quality is random and can-
not be fully controlled by the sellers. For example, in the deterministic model, a montone
partition as shown in Figure 5 necessarily leads to bunching of types at points of disconti-
nuity of x (·) while this is not the case when x is random.
5.2 An Auxiliary Problem and a Mathematical Result
Before characterization of optimal rating systems, we rst provide a mathematical result
regarding optimal signaled qualities in a class of auxiliary problems that helps us in charac-
terization of optimal rating systems. For an arbitrary function Γ (x), consider the following
optimization problem
max
x(·)
∫ 1
0
Γ (x)x (x)h (x) dx (P’)
subject to ∫ x
0
[x (x′)− x′]h (x′) dx′ ≥ 0∫ 1
0
[x (x)− x]h (x) dx = 0
x (x) ≥ x (x′) ,∀x ≥ x′.
Note that for any solution of (P1), the problem of choosing x (·) conditional on the choice
of q (θ) boils down to solving a problem of the form (P’) where Γ (x) is a function of Pareto
weights λ (·), distribution functions g (x|q (θ)), and lagrangian multipliers associated with
the incentive constraints (15). We will refer to the function Γ (x) as the gain function. As
we show in the following proposition, the main determinant of the solution of (P’) is the
derivative of Γ′ (·) and its sign. We refer to a solution as an alternating partition, if [0, 1]
can be partitioned to a collection of intervals and each interval is either fully pooled or
fully revealed with no two consecutive intervals being of the same type. The following
proposition, shows that under some fairly general assumptions on the gain function, the
optimal solution of problem (P’) is an alternating partition:
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Proposition 8. Suppose that a gain function Γ (x) is continuously dierentiable and that its
derivative changes sign k < ∞ times, i.e., we can partition [0, 1] into k intervals where in
each interval Γ′ (x) has the same sign but not in two consecutive intervals. Then, the optimal
information structure is an alternating partition with at most k intervals.
The proof is relegated to the appendix.
The above proposition provides a guideline for nding a solution to (P’). It generalizes
the intuition that if Γ (x) is increasing, then the solution of (P’) is fully revealing while
if Γ (x) is decreasing, the solution is pooling. The main idea of the proof is due to the
following insights which come from examining the optimality condition (16): 1. when the
majorization constraint binds over an interval, the gain function must be strictly increasing;
2. if [x1, x2) is a pooling interval, then Γ (x1) ≥ Γ (x2). Using these insights, we show that
every local optimum and its subsequent local minimum must belong to the same pooling
interval.
5.3 A Two-Type Example
While the above results illustrate the suciency of monotone partitions and a general un-
derstanding of optimal ratings, the exact nature of optimal rating systems depend on the de-
tails of the distribution of qualities and welfare weights. In what follows, we use a two-type
example to illustrate that some of the insights from the deterministic case carry through and
shed light on the determinants of optimal rating design in the presence of random quality
outcomes.
Specically, suppose that Θ = {θ1, θ2} with θ1 < θ2, f (θj) = fj , and λ (θ1) =
1, λ (θ2) = 0.21 Before stating our formal result, we provide a heuristic analysis of the
main determinants of optimal rating. Suppose that the lagrange multipliers on the incen-
tive compatibility constraints are γj . Then, the gain function associated with optimal rating
design is given by:
Γ (x) =
g (x|q1)
h (x)
(
1 + γ1
gq (x|q1)
g (x|q1) + γ2
gq (x|q2)
g (x|q2)
g (x|q2)
g (x|q1)
)
, (18)
where in the above h (x) = f1g (x|q1) + f2g (x|q2). Formally, given q1 and q2, optimal x (x)
must maximize
∫ 1
0
Γ (x)x (x)h (x) dx subject to monotonicity and majorization.
Analyzing the terms in the gain function identies two forces that shape the properties
of the optimal rating system:
1. Redistributive: The rst term in the gain function g (x|q1) /h (x) is a decreasing func-
tion of the likelihood ratio g (x|q2) /g (x|q1). Under part three of Assumption 2, i.e.,
the monotone likelihood ratio property, this likelihood function is increasing in x and
as a result the term g (x|q1) /h (x) is decreasing in x. Thus, when γ1 = γ2 = 0, i.e.,
when we do not have to worry about the eect of the rating system on incentives,
21As we show in section 6.1, maximizing revenue from a at fee for an intermediary leads to the same
outcome as this particular Pareto optimal rating.
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then optimal rating system is simply one that provides no information. This is be-
cause in this case, the gain function is positive for low values of x and negative for
high values.
2. Incentive: The second and third term in the gain function represents the importance
of incentive provision for types 1 and 2. The function gq (x|q) /g (x|q) is an increasing
function; negative for low values of x and positive for higher values of x. As a result,
the second term creates a force for information revelation. In fact, when γ1 and γ2 are
very large, the gain function Γ (x) becomes increasing and as a result it is optimal to
reveal all information.
At the optimum, the exact nature of the optimal rating system depends on how these forces
interact. While the guiding principle for the design of rating systems is Proposition 8, in
what follows, we provide conditions for which revelation must occur for high and low val-
ues. As we show later, various classes of distribution functions g (x|q) satisfy this assump-
tion:
Assumption 3. For arbitrary q2 > q1, dene the function xˆ (z) as the solution of z =
g (xˆ (z) |q2) /g (xˆ (z) |q1). The function xˆ (z) must satisfy the following properties:
1. The function φ (z) = gq (xˆ (z) |q) /g (xˆ (z) |q) satises φ′′ (z) ≤ 0,
2. The function ψ (z) = zgq (xˆ (z) |q) /g (xˆ (z) |q) satises ψ′′ (z) ≥ 0,
3. The function φ′′ (z) /ψ′′ (z) is increasing in z.
Using the above assumption, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 9. Suppose that Assumptions 2 and 3 hold. Furthermore, suppose that Θ =
{θ1, θ2} with θ1 < θ2 and that λ (θ1) = 1, λ (θ2) = 0. If at the optimum q2 ≥ q1, then there
exists two thresholds x1 < x2 where optimal rating system is fully revealing for values of x
below x1 and above x2 while it is pooling for values of x ∈ (x1, x2).
Proof is relegated to the Appendix.
Under Assumption 3, the incentive eects are strongest for extreme values of x while
the the redistributive force is strongest for mid values of x. As the Proposition illustrates
optimal rating system pools intermediate values of x while fully reveal extreme values.
Roughly speaking the full revelation of extreme values of x are associated with incentive
provision for types 1 and 2. Under Assumption 3, the incentive eect for type 1 – the second
term in the gain function (18) – is steepest for low values of x while the incentive eect for
type 2 – the third term in the gain function (18) – is steepest for high values of x. As a
result, mid-values of x are pooled, i.e., redistributive eect dominates, while at the extremes
incentive eects dominate.
Some examples of distributions that satisfy Assumption 3 are:
1. P.d.f. is a power ofx: G (x|q) = x q1−q which implies that gq (x|q) /g (x|q) = 1(1−q)2
(
log x+ 1−q
q
)
.
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2. P.d.f. is a power of 1−x: G (x|q) = 1−(1− x) 1−qq which implies that gq (x|q) /g (x|q) =
1
q2
(
− q
1−q − log (1− x)
)
.
3. P.d.f. is exponential of x : G (x|q) = (eλ(q)x − 1) / (eλ(q) − 1) for some function
λ (q). This implies that gq/g = A (q) log x + B (q). A similar property holds for
G (x|q) = (1− e−λ(q)x) / (1− e−λ(q)).
The analysis in this section illustrates two main lessons: 1. montone and alternating par-
titions are optimal when qualities are random, 2. the interplay between redistributive and
incentive eects determine when outcomes are pooled and when fully revealed. While the
details of the distribution function g (x|q) matters, our analysis suggests that full revelation
is important for the extreme realizations.
6 Extensions
In this section, we show how our results and analysis would extend beyond the model con-
sidered above.
6.1 Revenue-maximizing Intermediary
In the above analysis, we have considered optimal rating systems under Pareto optimality.
However, it is often the case that intermediaries are self-interested. Here, we discuss the
incentives of a revenue-maximizing intermediary that can charge the sellers a at fee for
entry.
Since the intermediary is a monopolist, a at fee charged to all sellers that enter the
market might lead to exclusion of some sellers. In other words, if the intermediary charges
a fee e, sellers only enter if their payo is higher than e. Note that since prots of the sellers
depend on the rating system, pi (s|q), their decision to enter depends on the rating system.
Thus, for any e and rating system pi (·), there must exists an entry cuto for sellers’ types
given by θˆ (e, pi (·)) which satises
e = Π
(
θˆ
)
= max
q′
∫
S
E [q|s] pi (ds, q′)− C
(
q′, θˆ
)
. (19)
Note that when the right hand side of (19) is higher than e for all values of θ, then θˆ = θ.22
Note that given the entry cuto, the revenue of the intermediary is given by e
[
1− F
(
θˆ (e, pi (·))
)]
.
The problem of the intermediary is thus to choose an entry fee and rating system to maxi-
mize this revenue.
An insight that helps us characterize the optimal rating system from the intermediary’s
perspective is that we can think about the intermediary choosing the cuto θˆ and the rating
system pi (·) and using (19) to calculate the required fee that induces the entry of types of
22We have assumed deterministic quality here. The analysis does not really change when quality is random.
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θˆ and higher. Viewing the intermediary’s problem this way, we can write its revenue as
Π
(
θˆ
) [
1− F
(
θˆ
)]
. Thus, given a θˆ, the problem of nding the optimal rating system is to
maximize the payo of type θˆ, Π
(
θˆ
)
. This is the same as the problem studied in section
(4.2). We thus have the following Proposition:
Proposition 10. A revenue-maximizing optimal rating system is full mixing.
Note that the introduction of the entry fee charged by the intermediary creates distor-
tions by limiting entry and thus reduces total surplus. Nevertheless, conditional on entry
the allocation is ecient – in the sense discussed in section 4. That is, given the set of active
types, optimal rating system is a low-quality optimal rating system with all the weight on
the lowest type that enters.
In analyzing the problem of the intermediary, it is also possible to consider heterogene-
ity in outside options for sellers. In particular, sellers’ outside option can be dependent on
their type, θ. In this case, the problem of the intermediary becomes similar to the objectives
considered in section 4 where one can interpret the welfare weights λ (θ) as the Lagrange
multipliers on the participation constraints faced by the intermediary. While in general solv-
ing the resulting mechanism design problem is dicult,23 one can loosely argue that these
multipliers are positively associated with the outside options, i.e., higher outside options
are associated with higher multipliers. Thus, under this interpretation, our analysis implies
that when higher quality sellers have a tighter participation constraint, then optimal ratings
should be perfectly revealing. As Hui et al. (2020) have illustrated using a change in eBay’s
certication policy, middle-quality sellers’ entry decision is more sensitive to changes in
information policy. This evidence suggests that the type of objectives in section 4.4 is more
relevant in that context.
6.2 The Role of Entry
In our analysis so far, we have assumed that all buyers and sellers have the same outside
option of 0 and that buyers compete away their surplus. This is mainly done for the sake of
exposition. Here, we describe what happens in the presence of endogenous entry.
Particularly, suppose that buyers’ outside option is random and given by ν and is dis-
tributed according to a dierentiable cumulative distribution function G (ν). We assume
that sellers’ outside option is 0. If we assume that the support of G (·) is the entire real line,
then there must exist a threshold νe where buyers will buy the object if and only if their
outside option is not greater than νe. Moreover, since our equilibrium concept is competi-
tive equilibrium, there must exist a threshold θe where sellers produce if and only if θ ≥ θe.
In equilibrium the level of prices must adjust so that markets clear, i.e.,
G (νe) = 1− F (θe) . (20)
In essence, with random outside options for buyers, the overall level of prices is deter-
mined by the market clearing condition (20). The properties of optimal rating systems that
23See Jullien (2000) for treating participation constraints in classic mechanism design.
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we have shown in section 4 hold independent of the division of the surplus between buyers
and sellers. This implies that the properties of optimal rating systems that we discussed in
section 4 go through even in the presence of endogenous entry. The only additional con-
straint that endogenous entry as modeled here imposes on optimal rating systems is that
the rating system must punish the seller types below θe in such a way to discourage their
entry.24
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the role and the design of rating systems in providing in-
centives for provision of quality. To solve the problem, we have showed a characterization
results that establishes that sellers’ second-order expectations are majorized by the sellers’
true quality choices. This characterization result allows us provide fairly general character-
ization of a certain subset of Pareto optimal rating systems and draw general insights on
optimal design of rating systems.
In our analysis, we have mainly focused on heterogeneity in quality in the form of ver-
tical dierentiation where all buyers value quality in the same fashion. Naturally, one can
ask about the eect of horizontal dierentiation. In such an environment, information pro-
vision improves the allocation and sorting of buyers among sellers with dierent quality. In
a companion paper Saeedi and Shourideh (2020), we undertake the analysis of this problem.
Additionally, one can argue that rating systems often use past performance to provide infor-
mation to the market.25 Designing rating systems in such a dynamic setting is an important
problem which we leave for future work.
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Appendix
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. We rst show that (5) holds:
Lemma 2. Let q be a vector of qualities and q be a vector of signaled qualities for an arbitrary
rating system. Then, there exists an N ×N positive matrixA such that
q = Aq,
where the matrixA satises
fTA = fT ,Ae = e, (21)
where e = (1, · · · , 1)T .
Proof. Given (4), A is given by
A = diag (f)−1
∫
µµTdτ,
which is simply a rewriting of (4) in matrix form; diag (f) is an N ×N matrix that has f as
diagonal and 0 otherwise. We have
Ae = diag (f)−1
∫
µµTedτ
= diag (f)−1
∫
µdτ
= e,
where µTe = 1 and f =
∫
µdτ . Moreover,
fTA =
∑
i
fi
1
fi
∫
µiµ
Tdτ
=
∑
i
∫
µiµ
Tdτ =
∫
µTdτ = fT .
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Now suppose that matrix A is given by A = (aij)i,j . We have that
k∑
i=1
fiqi =
k∑
i=1
fi
N∑
j=1
aijqj
=
N∑
j=1
qj
k∑
i=1
fiaij
≥
k−1∑
j=1
qj
k∑
i=1
fiaij + qk
N∑
j=k
k∑
i=1
fiaij. (22)
Since A satises (5), the following equality holds
k∑
i=1
fi
N∑
j=1
aij =
k∑
i=1
fi.
Thus, we can write the above as
k∑
i=1
fiqi ≥
k−1∑
j=1
qj
k∑
i=1
fiaij + qk
N∑
j=k
k∑
i=1
fiaij
=
k−1∑
j=1
qj
k∑
i=1
fiaij + qk
[
k∑
i=1
fi −
k−1∑
j=1
k∑
i=1
fiaij
]
=
k−1∑
j=1
qjfj +
k−1∑
j=1
qj
[
k∑
i=1
fiaij − fj
]
+
qk
[
fk +
k−1∑
j=1
fj −
k−1∑
j=1
k∑
i=1
fiaij
]
=
k∑
j=1
qjfj +
k−1∑
j=1
(qk − qj)
[
fj −
k∑
i=1
fiaij
]
=
k∑
j=1
qjfj +
k−1∑
j=1
(qk − qj)
N∑
i=k+1
fiaij
≥
k∑
j=1
qjfj,
where qk ≥ qj for all j ≤ k − 1 and fTA = fT . Finally,
fTq = fTAq = fTq,
which concludes the proof.
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A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. We dene S as follows
S =
{
r|∃τ ∈ ∆ (∆ (Θ)) , r = diag (f)−1
∫
µµTdτ · q with f =
∫
µdτ
}
This is obviously a compact set since S ⊂ [mini qi,max qi]N . Moreover S is a convex
set since if τ1 and τ2 satisfy Bayes plausibility, then so is their convex combination and
diag (f)−1
∫
µµTdτ is linear in τ . We show that if q satises the majorization property,
then it must be a member of S . To show this, we show that for any λ ∈ RN , there ex-
ists r ∈ S such that λTq ≤ λT r. Then if q /∈ S, then there must exist λ ∈ RN such that
λTq > λT r,∀r ∈ S . This is in contradiction with the previous claim and so we must have
that q ∈ S .
Note that without loss of generality, we can assume that λ ≥ 0. This is because if
λTq ≤ λT r then for some α > 0, we have
αfTq = αfTq
αfT r = α
∑
i
fi
1
fi
∫
µiµ
Tdτ · q
= α
∫ ∑
i
µiµ
Tdτ · q
= α
∫
µTdτ · q
= αfTq
and hence,
(λ+ αf)T q ≤ (λ+ αf)T r.
That is, a choice of α can guarantee that λ+ αf has all elements positive.
We prove that for all λ ≥ 0 there exists r ∈ K such that λTq ≤ λT r using induction
on N .
When N = 2, there are two cases:
1. λ1
λ1+λ2
≥ f1. In this case,
λ1
λ1 + λ2
q1 +
λ2
λ1 + λ2
q2 ≤ f1q1 + f2q2 = f1q1 + f2q2,
since q1 ≤ q2. Thus, if we choose τ ({f}) = 1 – no information, then r =
(
fTq, fTq
) ∈ S .
The above inequality then implies that
λTq ≤ (λ1 + λ2) fTq = λT r
which proves the claim.
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2. λ1
λ1+λ2
≤ f1. Since q1 ≥ q1 and fTq = fTq, we must have that q2 ≤ q2. Therefore,
q2 − q1 ≤ q2 − q1
Multiplying both sides by
(
λ2
λ1+λ2
− f2
)
≥ 0 we can write(
λ2
λ1 + λ2
− f2
)
(q2 − q1) ≤
(
λ2
λ1 + λ2
− f2
)
(q2 − q1)
and we can add f1q1 + f2q2 = f1q1 + f2q2 to both sides of the above inequality and have(
λ2
λ1 + λ2
− f2
)
(q2 − q1) + f2q2 + f1q1 ≤
(
λ2
λ1 + λ2
− f2
)
(q2 − q1) + f2q2 + f1q1
λ2
λ1 + λ2
q2 +
[
f1 + f2 − λ2
λ1 + λ2
]
q1 ≤
λ2
λ1 + λ2
q2 +
[
f1 + f2 − λ2
λ1 + λ2
]
q1
λ2
λ1 + λ2
q2 +
λ1
λ1 + λ2
q1 ≤
λ2
λ1 + λ2
q2 +
λ1
λ1 + λ2
q1
If we choose τ ({ei}) = fi, then τ satises Bayes plausibility andp′ = diag (f)−1
∫
µµTdτq =
diag (f)−1 diag (f)q = q and the above inequality implies λTq ≤ λTp′ which proves the
claim.
Now consider q,q and f and suppose that they satisfy the hypothesis of the claim. There
are two possibilities:
Case 1. ∃i ∈ {1, · · · , N} such that λi/fi ≤ λi−1/fi−1. In this case, consider the follow-
ing N − 1 dimensional vectors
q′ =
(
q1, · · · , qi−2,
fi−1qi−1 + fiqi
fi−1 + fi
, qi+1, · · · , qN
)
q′ =
(
q1, · · · , qi−2, fi−1qi−1 + fiqi
fi−1 + fi
, qi+1, · · · , qN
)
f ′ = (f1, · · · , fi−2, fi−1 + fi, fi+1, · · · , fN)
λ′ = (λ1, · · · , λi−2, λi−1 + λi, λi+1, · · · , λN)
We have that
k∑
j=1
f˜jq
′
j =
{∑k
j=1 fjqj k ≤ i− 2∑k+1
j=1 fjqj k ≥ i− 1
and a similar property holds for q˜. This implies that q′,q′ and f ′ satisfy the hypothesis of
our claim and as a result and by the induction hypothesis there exists τ ′ ∈ ∆ (∆ (Θ′)) –
with Θ′ =
{
1, 2, · · · , i− 2, iˆ, i+ 1, · · · , N
}
– so that
f ′ =
∫
µdτ ′, r′ = diag (f ′)−1
∫
µµTdτ ′q′, (λ′)T q′ ≤ (λ′)T r′ (23)
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We construct τ ∈ ∆ (∆ (Θ)) from τ ′ by assuming that τ always sends the same signal for
qi−1 and qi as τ ′. Formally, we dene a subset K of ∆ (Θ) as follows:
K =
{
µ ∈ ∆ (Θ) |∃µ′ ∈ ∆ (Θ′) , µj = µ′j, j 6= i, i− 1, µi−1 =
fi−1
fi−1 + fi
µ′
iˆ
, µi =
fi
fi−1 + fi
µ′
iˆ
}
This is a borel subset of ∆ (Θ) – the set of beliefs where µi/µi−1 = fi/fi−1. Moreover,
for any borel subset A of K , we can dene its projection P (A) in ∆ (Θ′) as P (A) ={
µ′|∃µ ∈ A, µ′j = µj, j 6= iˆ, µ′iˆ = µi−1 + µi
}
. Given this, we dene
τ (A) = τ ′ (P (A ∩K)) .
In words, the above information structure keeps the receiver fully uninformed about states
i and i − 1 since their relative probabilities are always equal to the relative probability of
the prior. We have∫
µdτ =
∫
K
µdτ =
∫
∆(Θ′)
(
µ1, · · · , µi−2, fi−1
fi−1 + fi
µiˆ,
fi
fi−1 + fi
µiˆ, µi+1, · · · , µN
)T
dτ ′
=
(∫
µ1dτ
′, · · · ,
∫
µi−2dτ ′,
fi−1
fi−1 + fi
∫
µiˆdτ
′,
fi
fi−1 + fi
∫
µiˆdτ
′,
∫
µi+1dτ
′, · · · ,
∫
µNdτ
′
)T
=
(
f1, · · · , fi−2, fi−1
fi−1 + fi
(fi−1 + fi) ,
fi
fi−1 + fi
(fi−1 + fi) , fi+1, · · · , fN
)T
= f
where in the above we have used the fact that τ ′ satises (23).
Moreover, we have
diag (f)−1
∫
µµTdτ =
(
1
fk
∫
µkµjdτ
)
k,j∈{1,··· ,N}
=

1
fk
∫
µkµjdτ
′ k, j 6= i, i− 1
1
fi+fi−1
∫
µiˆµjdτ
′ k ∈ {i, i− 1} , j 6= i, i− 1
fj
fk(fi+fi−1)
∫
µkµiˆdτ
′ k 6= i, i− 1, j ∈ {i, i− 1}
fj
(fi+fi−1)2
∫
(µiˆ)
2 dτ ′ k, j ∈ {i, i− 1}
Therefore, if we let r = diag (f)−1
(∫
µµTdτ
)
q, we have
rk =
1
fk
N∑
j=1
∫
µkµjdτqj
39
When k 6= i, i− 1, we can write the above as
rk =
1
fk
∑
j 6=i,i−1
∫
µkµjdτ
′qj
+
1
fk
fi−1
fi + fi−1
∫
µkµiˆdτ
′qi−1 +
1
fk
fi
fi + fi−1
∫
µkµiˆdτ
′qi
=
1
fk
∑
j 6=i,i−1
∫
µkµjdτ
′qj +
1
fk
∫
µkµiˆdτ
′qi−1
fiqi + fi−1qi−1
fi + fi−1
=
1
fk
∑
j∈Θˆ
∫
µkµjdτ
′q˜j = r′k
where in the above we have used the fact that qj = q′j for all j 6= i, i−1 and q′iˆ =
fiqi+fi−1qi−1
fi−1+fi
and the denition of r. If k = i, i− 1, then
rk =
1
fi + fi−1
∑
j 6=i,i−1
∫
µiˆµjdτ
′qj
+
fi
(fi + fi−1)
2
∫
(µiˆ)
2 dτ ′qi +
fi−1
(fi + fi−1)
2
∫
(µiˆ)
2 dτ ′qi−1
=
1
fi + fi−1
∑
j 6=i,i−1
∫
µiˆµjdτ
′qj
+
1
(fi + fi−1)
∫
(µiˆ)
2 dτ ′
fiqi + fi−1qi−1
fi + fi−1
=
1
f ′
iˆ
∑
j∈Θˆ
∫
µiˆµjdτ
′q˜j = r′iˆ
This implies that
λT r =
N∑
j=1
λjrj
=
∑
j 6=i,i−1
λjr
′
j + (λi + λi−1) r
′
iˆ
=
∑
j=i,i−1
λ′jr
′
j + λ
′
iˆ
r′
iˆ
= (λ′)T r′
Moreover,
λTq =
N∑
j=1
λjqj
=
∑
j 6=i,i−1
λjqj + λi−1qi−1 + λiqi
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We can write
λi−1qi−1 + λiqi = fi−1
λi−1
fi−1
qi−1 + fi
λi
fi
qi
Since
λi−1
fi−1
≥ λi
fi
, qi−1 ≤ qi
Chebyshev’s sum inequality implies that
fi−1
fi−1 + fi
λi−1
fi−1
qi−1 +
fi
fi + fi−1
λi
fi
qi ≤
(
fi−1
fi−1 + fi
λi−1
fi−1
+
fi
fi + fi−1
λi
fi
)
×(
fi−1
fi−1 + fi
qi−1 +
fi
fi + fi−1
qi
)
=
λi−1 + λi
fi−1 + fi
fi−1qi−1 + fiqi
fi−1 + fi
=
λ′
iˆ
fi−1 + fi
q′
iˆ
That is
λi−1qi−1 + λiqi ≤ λ′iˆq′iˆ
We can therefore write
λTq ≤ (λ′)T q′
and as a result
λTq ≤ (λ′)T q′ ≤ (λ′)T r′ = λT r
which establishes the claim.
Case 2. ∀i ∈ {1, · · · , N} , λi−1
fi−1
≤ λi
fi
. Then we can write
λTq =
N∑
i=1
λipi =
N∑
i=1
λi
fi
fipi
=
N∑
i=1
(
λi
fi
− λi−1
fi−1
) N∑
j=i
fjpj
=
N∑
i=1
(
λi
fi
− λi−1
fi−1
)[
fTq−
i−1∑
j=1
fjpj
]
≤
N∑
i=1
(
λi
fi
− λi−1
fi−1
)[
fTq−
i−1∑
j=1
fjqj
]
=
N∑
i=1
(
λi
fi
− λi−1
fi−1
) N∑
j=i
fjqj
=
N∑
i=1
λi
fi
fiqi = λ
Tq
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Note thatq is the vector of expected signaled qualities under full information, i.e., τ ({ei}) =
fi and thus q ∈ S . This completes the proof.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The proof of incentive compatibility and the “only if” direction of the claim is straight-
forward and is omitted. Here, we prove the “if” part. In other words, consider a pair of
functions {q (θ) , q (θ)}θ∈Θ that satisfy conditions 1 and 2 in the statement of proposition.
Consider a sequence of partitions of Θ given by Θn =
{
θ = θn0 < θ
n
1 < · · · < θnn = θ
}
for n = 1, 2, · · · with mini:0≤i≤n−1 θni+1 − θni → 0 and Θn ⊂ Θn+1. Dene fn,qn,qn as
follows
fni = F (θ
n
i −)− F
(
θni−1
)
, 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1
fnn = F
(
θ
)− F (θnn−1)
qni =

∫ θni
θn
i−1
q(θ)dF (θ)
fni
if fni > 0
q
(
θni−1
)
if fni = 0
qni =

∫ θni
θn
i−1
q(θ)dF (θ)
fni
if fni > 0
q
(
θni−1
)
if fni = 0
Let qn and qn represent the discrete random variables whose values are given by qni and
qni with probability fni . Given that q (θ) and q (θ) are increasing functions, then qni and qni
are increasing in i. Moreover, by construction, qn <Fn qn. Thus, we can use Theorem 1
and an information structure (pin, Sn) exists where pin : Θn → ∆ (Sn) exists under which
qni = E [E [qni |s] |qni ]. Note that each (pin, Sn) induces a distribution over posterior beliefs
of the buyers given by τn ∈ ∆ (∆ (Θn)). Note that since any measure in ∆ (Θn) can be
embedded in ∆ (Θ). This is because for any µ = (µ1, · · · , µn) ∈ ∆ (Θn) we can construct
µˆ ∈ ∆ (Θ) dened by µˆ (A) = ∑ni=1 µi1 [θni ∈ A] where A is an arbitrary Borel subset of
Θ. Similarly, we can nd τˆn ∈ ∆ (∆ (Θ)) which is equivalent to τn.
Now consider the random variable representing the joint distribution of θn and posterior
mean µ [q] =
∫
q (θ) dµ for any µ ∈ Supp (τˆn). Let this be given by ζn = (qn, µ [q]) where
ζn ∈ ∆ (q (Θ)× q (Θ)) – where q (Θ) = {q (θ) |θ ∈ Θ}. By an application of Reisz Repre-
sentation theorem (see Theorem 14.12 in Aliprantis and Border (2013)), ∆ (q (Θ)× q (Θ))
is compact according to the weak-* topology.26 This implies that the sequence {ζn} must
26A rough argument for sequential compactness of ∆ (q (Θ)× q (Θ)) is as follows: Note that C (X), the
space of all continuous functions on X = q (Θ) × q (Θ), is separable since X is a compact, metrizable,
and Hausdor space (see Reisz’s Theorem in Royden and Fitzpatrick (1988) – section12.3, page 251.) This
implies that there exists a countable subset {fi}∞i=1 of C (X) which is dense in C (X) according to sup-norm.
Thus, for any sequence of measures {µm}∞m=1 in ∆ (X), for a given i, the sequence {µm (fi)}∞m=1 where
µ (f) =
∫
f (θ) dµ must have a convergent subsequent. Iterating repeatedly, as we increase i, we can nd
a subsequence {µmk}∞k=1 where {µmk (fi)} converges. We dene ζ (fi) = limk→∞ µmk (fi). Since {fi} is
dense in C (X), then ζ (f) = limk→∞ µmk (f) must exists for all f ∈ C (X) and can be similarly dened.
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have a convergent subsequence whose limit is given by ζ ∈ ∆ (q (Θ)× q (Θ)). Let Gn be the
σ-eld generated by the sets
{[
q (θni ) , q
(
θni+1
))}
i≤n−1 ∪
{[
q
(
θnn−1
)
, q
(
θ
)]}
and let Fn =
Gn × {∅,∆ (q (Θ))}. In words, Fn conveys the information that q (θ) ∈ [q (θni ) , q (θni+1))
or q (θ) ∈ [q (θnn−1) , q (θ)]. Note that Fn ⊂ Fn+1 because Θn ⊂ Θn+1. Moreover,
E [ζn|Fn] = (qn, qn)
where the above holds by the construction of τn and ζn. As a result
E
[
ζn+1|Fn] = E [E [ζn+1|Fn+1] |Fn]
= E
[(
qn+1, qn+1
) |Fn]
= (qn, qn)
where the last equality follows because E [q (θ) |Fn] = qn,E [q (θ) |Fn] = qn given the def-
inition of qn and qn above. All of this implies that Fn is a ltration and (ζn,Fn) forms a
bounded martingale – for a denition see Doob (1994). Hence by Doob’s martingale con-
vergence theorem – see Theorem XI.14 in Doob (1994), we must have that
lim
n→∞
E [ζn|Fn] = E [ζ|F ]
Therefore, Eζ [µ [q] |q (θ)] = q (θ). This concludes the proof.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. We prove the claim for a discrete distribution. The general claim follows from argu-
ments similar to those made in the proof of Proposition 2.
Suppose that majorization inequality holds for some k < N , i.e., we have
k∑
i=1
fiqi =
k∑
i=1
fiqi
Recall the proof of Proposition 1. If for all j > k, qj > qk, then the above equality implies
that the inequality (22) must hold with equality. As a result, we must have that aij = 0 for
all j ≥ k + 1, i ≤ k. Note that by denition of aij , it is given by
aij =
∑
s∈S
pi ({s} |qi) pi ({s} |qj) fj∑N
l=1 pi ({s} |ql) fl
where in the aboveS = ∪Nl=1Supp (pi (·|ql)). Hence, for all i ≤ k, j ≥ k+1, pi ({s} |qi) pi ({s} |qj) =
0. This implies that ∪i≤kSupp (pi (·|qi)) ∩ ∪j≥k+1Supp (pi (·|qj)) = ∅ which establishes the
claim.
It is easy to show that ζ (f) is a linear functional over C (X) and thus a member of its dual, C (X)∗. Hence,
there must exists a measure ζˆ ∈ ∆ (X) where ζ (f) = ∫ fdζˆ . This implies that µmk converges to ζˆ according
to the weak-* topology and hence, ∆ (X) is sequentially compact.
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A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Consider the relaxed optimization problem given by
max
∫ θ
θ
λ (θ) Π (θ) dF (θ)
subject to
Π′ (θ) = −Cθ (q (θ) , θ) ,∀θ
q (θ) : increasing∫ θ
θ
Π (θ) dF (θ) =
∫ θ
θ
[q (θ)− C (q (θ) , θ)] dF (θ)
Π (θ) ≥ 0
We show that the solution to the above optimization satises the majorization constraint.
Given incentive compatibility, we can calculate Π (θ) using integration by parts
Π (θ) =
∫ θ
θ
[
q (θ)− C (q (θ) , θ) + Cθ (q (θ) , θ) 1− F (θ)
f (θ)
]
dF (θ)
Hence, the objective becomes∫ θ
θ
{
q (θ)− C (q (θ) , θ) + Cθ (q (θ) , θ)
[1− F (θ)]− ∫ θ
θ
λ (θ′) dF (θ′)
f (θ)
}
dF (θ) (24)
Note that since
∫
λ (θ) dF = 1 and λ (θ) is decreasing, we have
1 >
∫ θ
θ
λ (θ′) dF (θ′)
1− F (θ) , ∀θ
Now suppose that for an interval I = [θ1, θ2] of θ’s, Cq (q (θ) , θ) > 1 at the optimum. If
over this interval, q (θ) is strictly increasing, then we can reduce q (θ) such that at its lower
end, q (θ) does not decrease. If Cq > 1, a perturbation of q (θ) given by δq (θ) < 0 changes
the objective by∫
I
{
1− Cq (q (θ) , θ) + Cθq (q (θ) , θ)
1− F (θ)− ∫ θ
θ
λ (θ′) dF (θ′)
f (θ)
}
δq (θ) dF (θ)
We have
Cθq (q (θ) , θ) < 0, δq (θ) < 0,
1− F (θ)− ∫ θ
θ
λ (θ′) dF (θ′)
f (θ)
> 0
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Therefore, ∫
I
Cθq (q (θ) , θ)
1− F (θ)− ∫ θ
θ
λ (θ′) dF (θ′)
f (θ)
δq (θ) dF > 0
Moreover, ∫
[1− Cq (q (θ) , θ)] δq (θ) dF > 0
Thus, this perturbation increases the objective. Therefore, we cannot have Cq > 1 at the
optimum. Thus, we have Cq ≤ 1. If on the other hand, q (θ) is constant over an interval of
the form
[
θ1, θˆ
]
, we can nd the lowest θ0 for which q (θ0) = q (θ1). Since Cq > 1 over I ,
either there is a discontinuity at θ0 in which case the above argument works or Cq > 1 even
for values below θ0. In this case, we extend I below θ0 and repeat the above perturbation.
From the incentive constraint, we have
q′ (θ) = Cq (q (θ) , θ) q′ (θ) ≤ q′ (θ)
Therefore, the function q (θ)− q (θ) is a weakly decreasing function. This implies that∫ θ
θ
[q (θ′)− q (θ′)] dF (θ′)
F (θ)
≥
∫ θ
θ
[q (θ′)− q (θ′)] dF (θ′)
1− F (θ)
Hence,
0 =
∫ θ
θ
[q (θ′)− q (θ′)] dF (θ′) +
∫ θ
θ
[q (θ′)− q (θ′)] dF (θ′)
≤
∫ θ
θ
[q (θ′)− q (θ′)] dF (θ′) + (1− F (θ))
∫ θ
θ
[q (θ′)− q (θ′)] dF (θ′)
F (θ)
=
∫ θ
θ
[q (θ′)− q (θ′)] dF (θ′)
F (θ)
(
1 +
1− F (θ)
F (θ)
)
=
∫ θ
θ
[q (θ′)− q (θ′)] dF (θ′)
(
1 +
1− F (θ)
F (θ)
)
=
∫ θ
θ
[q (θ′)− q (θ′)] dF (θ′) 1
F (θ)
which implies that the allocation satises the majorization constraint.
The above proof also illustrates that when C (·, ·) is strictly sub-modular, then it must
be that Cq < 1 for all values of θ. This is because the integrand in objective in (24) is strictly
decreasing in q (θ) at qFB (θ). This concludes the proof.
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A.6 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. We show that rst best allocation is the solution to relaxed problem where the in-
centive constraint is replaced with
Π (θ)− Π (θ) ≤ −
∫ θ
θ
Cθ (q (θ
′) , θ′) dθ′ (25)
Suppose to the contrary that at the optimum, there is an interval of θ’s such that the ma-
jorization constraint is slack. Let’s consider such an interval I = (θ1, θ2) and assume that the
majorization constraint binds at θ1 and θ2. Such interval must exists since
∫ θ
θ
[q (θ′)− q (θ′)] dF (θ′)
is continuous function of θ and as a result the set of θ’s for which it takes positive values is
an open set. Hence, it must be a countable union of disjoint intervals.
We show a contradiction in a few steps:
Step 1. For any subinterval of I , (25) cannot be slack. Suppose, to the contrary, that this
is the case and that there is a subinterval I ′ ⊂ I in which (25) is slack. Let θˆ be the
mid-point of I ′. Then consider the following perturbation
δq (θ) =

−ε′ θ ∈ I ′, θ < θˆ
ε θ ∈ I ′, θ ≥ θˆ
0 θ /∈ I ′
where −ε′
[
F
(
θˆ
)
− F (min I ′)
]
+ ε
[
F (max I ′)− F
(
θˆ
)]
= 0 and ε, ε′ > 0. Since
majorization is slack over I ′, there exists a value of ε and ε′ small enough so that this
perturbation does not violate the majorization constraint. Moreover, (25) is slack over
I ′ there exists a value of ε and ε′ small enough so that (25) is satised. As a result, the
perturbed allocation is still feasible and satises the constraints. The change in the
objective resulting from this perturbation is given by∫
I′
λ (θ) δΠ (θ) dF (θ) = −ε′
∫ θˆ
min I′
λ (θ) dF (θ) + ε
∫ max I′
θˆ
λ (θ) dF (θ)
= ε
∫ max I′
θˆ
λ (θ) dF (θ)−
F (max I ′)− F
(
θˆ
)
F
(
θˆ
)
− F (min I ′)
∫ θˆ
min I′
λ (θ) dF (θ)

= ε
(
F (max I ′)− F
(
θˆ
)) ∫ max I′θˆ λ (θ) dF (θ)
F (max I ′)− F
(
θˆ
) − ∫ θˆmin I′ λ (θ) dF (θ)
F
(
θˆ
)
− F (min I ′)
 > 0
where the last inequality holds because λ (θ) is strictly increasing. The above implies
the required contradiction since this perturbation increases the objective.
Step 2. If q (θ) is strictly increasing over a subinterval of I , then it must be that
Cq (q (θ) , θ) ≥ 1. Suppose not. Then, since q (θ) is strictly increasing over
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I ′ ⊂ I , it is possible to nd a perturbation δq (θ) of q (θ) with δq (max I ′) = 0
and δq (θ) > 0,∀θ ∈ I ′/ {max I ′} which keeps q (θ) monotone – see Figure 3.
Let δq (θ) be given by
δq (θ) =
{
δq (θ)Cq (q (θ) , θ) +
∫
I′ [1− Cq (q (θ) , θ)] δq (θ) dF (θ) θ ∈ I ′∫
I′ [1− Cq (q (θ) , θ)] δq (θ) dF (θ) θ /∈ I ′
We have
∀θ ∈ I ′,δΠ (θ) = δq (θ)− Cq (q (θ) , θ) δq (θ) =
∫
I′
[1− Cq (q (θ) , θ)] δq (θ) dF (θ)
∀θ /∈ I ′,δΠ (θ) =
∫
I′
[1− Cq (q (θ) , θ)] δq (θ) dF (θ)
This implies that the perturbation keeps the LHS of (25) unchanged. SinceCθq ≤
0, the perturbation increases the RHS of (25) and as a result the inequality (25) is
satised for this perturbed allocation. Moreover, since majorization is slack over
I ′ for a small enough perturbation δq (θ) it is still satised. This perturbation
increases the prots of all sellers while it keep buyers’ utility unchanged. This
implies the required contradiction.
Step 3. We show that the above two statements lead to a contradiction. Since (25)
binds for all values of θ except for a measure zero set, it must be that Π (θ) is
almost everywhere monotone and as a result almost everywhere dierentiable.
We thus have
Π′ (θ) = −Cθ (q (θ) , θ)
which then implies
q′ (θ) = Cq (q (θ) , θ) q′ (θ) ≥ q′ (θ)
Since majorization binds at θ1 and θ2, we must have that q (θ1) ≥ q (θ1) and∫ θ2
θ1
[q (θ)− q (θ)] dF (θ) = 0. Therefore, we must have that q (θ) ≥ q (θ) for
almost all values of θ ∈ I . Since ∫ θ2
θ1
[q (θ)− q (θ)] dF (θ) = 0, we must have that
q (θ) = q (θ) for almost all values of θ ∈ I . This in turn implies that majorization
is binding for almost all values of θ ∈ I which is a contradiction.
The above arguments establishes that the majorization constraint must be binding for all
values of θ. Hence, q (θ) = q (θ) for all values of θ and thus the objective is maximized at
q (θ) = qFB (θ) which concludes the proof.
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A.7 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. We show the desired properties in the solution to the more relaxed problem were
incentive compatibility
Π (θ)− Π (θ) = −
∫ θ
θ
Cθ (q (θ
′) , θ′) dθ′
q (θ) : increasing
is replaced with the following
Π (θ)− Π (θ) ≤ −
∫ θ
θ
Cθ (q (θ
′) , θ′) dθ′,∀θ ≤ θ∗ (26)
Π
(
θ
)− Π (θ) ≥ −∫ θ
θ
Cθ (q (θ
′) , θ′) dθ′,∀θ ≥ θ∗ (27)
q (θ) : increasing
As we will show, in the solution of this more relaxed programing problem, the above in-
equalities are binding.
In order to show the claim, we rst show that if the majorization inequality binds for
some value of θ′ ≤ θ∗, then it must be binding for all values of θ ≤ θ′. The argument is
similar to that of proof of Proposition 5. Hence, we skip the details and describe in brief. In
particular, suppose that there exists an interval I = [θ1, θ2] with θ2 ≤ θ∗, where majorization
is binding at θ1 and θ2 while it is slack for all values of θ ∈ (θ1, θ2). Then the exact same
steps as in proof of Proposition 5 lead to a contradiction.
Next, we show that for any θ > θ∗, the majorization constraint is slack. First, note
that the incentive constraints (27) must be binding for all values of θ > θ∗. Suppose to the
contrary that the incentive constraint is slack for an interval, I , of θ’s above θ∗. Then let θˆ
be the mid-point of I and consider the following perturbation:
δq (θ) =

ε θ ∈ I, θ ≤ θˆ
−ε′ θ ∈ I, θ > θˆ
0 θ /∈ I
where ε, ε′ > 0 and ε
[
F
(
θˆ
)
− F (min I)
]
−ε′
[
F (max I)− F
(
θˆ
)]
= 0. This is incentive
compatible for a small enough values of ε, ε′ since incentive compatibility is slack over I .
Moreover, since signaled qualities are being allocated to lower θ’s, the perturbed allocation
satises majorization. Hence, it must increase the value of the objective since λ (θ) is strictly
decreasing for values of θ ≥ θ∗.
Now, suppose to the contrary that for some θ′ > θ∗, majorization is binding. Given that
we have argued that (27) is binding for all values θ ≥ θ∗ and since ∫ θ
θ
Cθ
(
q
(
θˆ
)
, θˆ
)
dθˆ is
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continuous in θ, then Π (θ) must be continuous over
[
θ∗, θ
]
. Moreover, since majorization
is binding at θ′, we must have∫ θ
θ′
[
q
(
θˆ
)
− q
(
θˆ
)]
dF
(
θˆ
)
≥ 0, θ > θ′∫ θ′
θ
[
q
(
θˆ
)
− q
(
θˆ
)]
dF
(
θˆ
)
≤ 0, θ < θ′
Dividing the top inequality by F (θ)− F (θ′) and bottom one by F (θ′)− F (θ) and taking
limit as θ tends to θ′, using l’hÃŽpital’s rule, we have27
q (θ′) ≥ q (θ′)
q (θ′−) ≤ q (θ′−)
These imply that
Π (θ′) = q (θ′−)− C (q (θ′−) , θ′) ≤q (θ′−)− C (q (θ′−) , θ′)
≤qFB (θ′)− C (qFB (θ′) , θ′)
Now, we show that given this property there is an alternative allocation that improves the
objective in the relaxed problem. In particular, consider the solution of the problem
max
q(θ),q(θ)
∫ θ
θ′
Π (θ)λ (θ) dF (θ)
subject to
Π′ (θ) = −Cθ (q (θ) , θ)
Π (θ) = q (θ)− C (q (θ) , θ)
q (θ) : monotone∫ θ
θ′
Π (θ) dF (θ) =
∫ θ
θ′
[q (θ)− C (q (θ) , θ)] dF (θ)
Let the solution to the above be referred to as {qr (θ) , qr (θ)}θ∈[θ′,θ]. As we have shown
in the proof of Proposition 4, the solution of the above problem satises Cq ≤ 1 with a
strict inequality for a positive measure of types. This would imply that in the solution of
the above problem Πr (θ′) > qFB (θ′)−C
(
qFB (θ′) , θ′
)
; otherwise, the rst best allocation
would deliver a higher objective. This also implies that given the contradiction assumption,∫ θ
θ′ Π (θ)λ (θ) dF (θ) <
∫ θ
θ′ Πr (θ)λ (θ) dF (θ).
Now, we consider the following allocation: {q (θ) , q (θ)}θ<θ′ , {qr (θ) , qr (θ)}θ≥θ′ . This
obviously satises incentive compatibility for values of θ ≤ θ∗. Moreover, we have
Πr
(
θ
)− Π (θ′) > Πr (θ)− Πr (θ′) = −∫ θ
θ′
Cθ
(
qr
(
θˆ
)
, θˆ
)
dθˆ
27q (θ−) is the left limit of q (·) at θ.
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and thus the allocation satises incentive compatibility constraint 27 and improves the ob-
jective. We, thus have a contradiction.
So far, we have established that there must exist a threshold θ˜ ≤ θ∗ below which ma-
jorization constraint is binding while above it the majorization constraint is slack. Since
below θ˜ majorization is binding, we must have that q (θ) = q (θ) for all values of θ ≤ θ˜. As
a result, Π
(
θ˜
)
≤ qFB
(
θ˜
)
−C
(
qFB
(
θ˜
)
, θ˜
)
. Note that incentive compatibility combined
with q (θ) = q (θ) implies that there exists a threshold θˆ such that for θ ≤ θˆ, q (θ) = qFB (θ)
and q (θ) = qFB
(
θˆ
)
= q
(
θ˜
)
for all θ ∈
[
θˆ, θ˜
]
.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. In order to prove this result, we rst show the following lemma:
Lemma 3. For any subinterval [x0, x2) of [0, 1] and any x1 ∈ [x0, x2), consider signaled
quality functions xs (x) and xp (x) dened over [x0, x2) as follows:
xs (x) =

∫ x1
x0
xh(x)dx∫ x1
x0
h(x)dx
x ∈ [x0, x1)∫ x2
x1
xh(x)dx∫ x2
x1
h(x)dx
x ∈ [x1, x2)
xp (x) =
∫ x2
x0
xh (x) dx∫ x2
x0
h (x) dx
,∀x ∈ [x0, x2)
Then,
∫ x2
x0
Γ (x)xp (x)h (x) dx ≥
∫ x2
x0
Γ (x)xs (x)h (x) dx if and only if∫ x1
x0
Γ (x)h (x) dx∫ x1
x0
h (x) dx
≥
∫ x2
x1
Γ (x)h (x) dx∫ x2
x1
h (x) dx
. (28)
Proof. Let us dene a1 =
∫ x1
x0
Γ(x)h(x)dx∫ x1
x0
h(x)dx
, a2 =
∫ x2
x1
Γ(x)h(x)dx∫ x2
x1
h(x)dx
, b1 =
∫ x1
x0
xh(x)dx∫ x1
x0
h(x)dx
, b2 =
∫ x2
x1
xh(x)dx∫ x2
x1
h(x)dx
and α =
∫ x1
x0
h (x) dx, β =
∫ x2
x1
h (x) dx. Since b1 < b2, by Chebyshev’s sum inequality –
see Hardy et al. (1934), Theorem 43 – a1 ≥ a2 if and only if
(α + β) (αa1b1 + βa2b2) ≤ (αa1 + βa2) (αb1 + βb2) (29)
We have
αa1b1 + βa2b2 =
∫ x1
x0
Γ (x)h (x) dx
∫ x1
x0
xh (x) dx∫ x1
x0
h (x) dx
+
∫ x2
x1
Γ (x)h (x) dx
∫ x2
x1
xh (x) dx∫ x2
x1
h (x) dx
=
∫ x2
x0
Γ (x)xs (x)h (x) dx
αa1 + βa2 =
∫ x1
x0
Γ (x)h (x) dx+
∫ x2
x1
Γ (x)h (x) dx =
∫ x2
x0
Γ (x)h (x) dx
αb1 + βb2 =
∫ x1
x0
xh (x) dx+
∫ x2
x1
xh (x) dx =
∫ x2
x0
xh (x) dx
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Thus (29) becomes∫ x2
x0
h (x) dx
∫ x2
x0
Γ (x)xs (x)h (x) dx ≤
∫ x2
x0
Γ (x)h (x) dx
∫ x2
x0
xh (x) dx
or ∫ x2
x0
Γ (x)xs (x)h (x) dx ≤
∫ x2
x0
Γ (x)xp (x)h (x) dx
This proves the claim.
In words, the above lemma implies that if the solution to (29), involves two consecutive
pooling intervals, then it must be that average value of Γ (x) is lower at the lower pooling
interval. A similar argument to that of Proposition 7 shows that for the solution to (P’),
there must exist a collection of half-intervals {Kα}α∈A where each half-interval involves
either pooling, i.e., x (·) is constant for x ∈ Kα, or it is fully separating, i.e., x (x) = x for all
x ∈ Kα. We use the above lemma to show that if two half-intervals Kα and Kβ which are
both pooling and supKα = minKβ , then
∫
Kα
Γ(x)h(x)dx∫
Kα
h(x)dx
=
∫
Kβ
Γ(x)h(x)dx∫
Kβ
h(x)dx
and thus, we can
simply replace Kα, Kβ with their union Kα ∪Kβ – this is also implied by Lemma (3):
Lemma 4. Let x (x) be a solution to (P’) and suppose that x0 < x1 < x2 exists such that x (·)
is constant over [x0, x1) and [x1, x2); with x (x0−) < x (x0) = x (x1−) < x (x2−) < x (x2).
Then,
∫ x1
x0
Γ(x)h(x)dx∫ x1
x0
h(x)dx
=
∫ x2
x1
Γ(x)h(x)dx∫ x2
x1
h(x)dx
.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that
∫ x1
x0
Γ(x)h(x)dx∫ x1
x0
h(x)dx
6=
∫ x2
x1
Γ(x)h(x)dx∫ x2
x1
h(x)dx
. If
∫ x1
x0
Γ(x)h(x)dx∫ x1
x0
h(x)dx
>
∫ x2
x1
Γ(x)h(x)dx∫ x2
x1
h(x)dx
,
then an alternative signaled quality function xa (x) would deliver a higher payo:
xa (x) =

∫ x2
x0
xh(x)dx∫ x2
x0
h(x)dx
x ∈ [x0, x2)
x (x) otherwise
That xa (x) delivers a higher objective relative to x (·) is a direct result of Lemma 3. This
is because xa pools all values of x in [x0, x2) while x separates the interval [x0, x1) from
[x1, x2). This is a contradiction as x (·) was assumed to be optimal.
Now, suppose that
∫ x1
x0
Γ(x)h(x)dx∫ x1
x0
h(x)dx
<
∫ x2
x1
Γ(x)h(x)dx∫ x2
x1
h(x)dx
. Since x (·) is optimal and it pools values
of x in each interval [x0, x1) and [x1, x2), an argument similar to above can be used to show
that the following must hold∫ x
x1
Γ (x′)h (x′) dx′∫ x
x1
h (x′) dx′
≥
∫ x2
x
Γ (x′)h (x′) dx′∫ x2
x
h (x′) dx′
,∀x ∈ [x1, x2) (30)∫ x
x0
Γ (x′)h (x′) dx′∫ x
x0
h (x′) dx′
≥
∫ x1
x
Γ (x′)h (x′) dx′∫ x1
x
h (x′) dx′
,∀x ∈ [x0, x1) (31)
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This is because if for some x, the above are reversed – for example (30), we can use Lemma
3 to show that separating [x1, x) and [x, x2) would increase the value of the objective which
is a contradiction. Now, consider (30). We can take limit of x as it converges to x1. Using
l’HÃŽpital’s rule, we have the following
Γ (x1) ≥
∫ x2
x1
Γ (x)h (x) dx∫ x2
x1
h (x) dx
Similarly, by taking the limit as x converges to x2, we have∫ x2
x1
Γ (x)h (x) dx∫ x2
x1
h (x) dx
≥ Γ (x2)
Hence,
Γ (x1) ≥
∫ x2
x1
Γ (x)h (x) dx∫ x2
x1
h (x) dx
≥ Γ (x2)
Using a similar argument, we have
Γ (x0) ≥
∫ x1
x0
Γ (x)h (x) dx∫ x1
x0
h (x) dx
≥ Γ (x1)
This is in contradiction with our initial assumption of
∫ x1
x0
Γ(x)h(x)dx∫ x1
x0
h(x)dx
<
∫ x2
x1
Γ(x)h(x)dx∫ x2
x1
h(x)dx
as the
above inequalities imply that
∫ x1
x0
Γ(x)h(x)dx∫ x1
x0
h(x)dx
≥ Γ (x1) ≥
∫ x2
x1
Γ(x)h(x)dx∫ x2
x1
h(x)dx
. This completes the
proof.
The above lemma establishes that for the solution of (P’) we can focus our attention on
signaled quality functions that are alternating partitions since we can assume that there are
not consecutive pooling intervals at the optimum. The next lemma establishes that there
can only be k partitions by showing that if there is a fully revealing interval at the optimum
Γ (x) must be increasing over this interval:
Lemma 5. Let x (·) be a solution to (P’) and suppose that x1 < x2 exist such that x (x) =
x, ∀x ∈ [x1, x2) and x (x1−) < x1 and x (x2) > x2. Then, Γ (x) is weakly increasing over
[x1, x2).
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that the gain function is not increasing over [x1, x2). Then
there must exist a subinterval [x3, x4) of [x1, x2) wherein Γ (x) is strictly decreasing – this
is because Γ′ (x) is a continuous function. Now, let us consider the following alternative
signaled quality function
xa (x) =

∫ x4
x3
xh(x)dx∫ x4
x3
h(x)dx
x ∈ [x3, x4)
x (x) otherwise
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Note that by Chebyshev sum (integral) inequality since Γ (x) is strictly decreasing over
[x3, x4) and h (·) is full support,∫ x4
x3
xh (x) dx
∫ x4
x3
Γ (x)h (x) dx >
∫ x4
x3
Γ (x)xh (x) dx
∫ x4
x3
h (x) dx
or ∫ x4
x3
xh (x) dx∫ x4
x3
h (x) dx
∫ x4
x3
Γ (x)h (x) dx >
∫ x4
x3
xΓ (x)h (x) dx.
Hence, ∫ 1
0
Γ (x)xa (x)h (x) dx−
∫ 1
0
Γ (x)x (x)h (x) dx =∫ x4
x3
xh (x) dx∫ x4
x3
h (x) dx
∫ x4
x3
Γ (x)h (x) dx−
∫ x4
x3
xΓ (x)h (x) dx > 0
which is a contradiction since x (·) is optimal.
Lemmas 4 and 5 establish our claim. By Lemma 4, solution of (P’) is an alternating
partition – alternating between pooling and separating – and by Lemma 5, its separating
parts are a subset of increasing parts of Γ (x). Since Γ′ (x) switches sign k times, we must
have that at the optimum there are at most k intervals.
A.9 Proof of Proposition 9
Proof. To prove the claim, we provide a characterization of the properties of the gain func-
tion and use . Note that the gain function is given by
Γ (x) =
g (x|q1)
h (x)
(
1 + γ1
gq (x|q1)
g (x|q1) + γ2
gq (x|q2)
g (x|q2)
g (x|q2)
g (x|q1)
)
− 1
Before, characterizing properties of the gain function, we prove that γ2 is positive. To do
so, we consider an alternative planning problem
max
∫ 1
0
x (x) g (x|q1) dx− C (q1, θ1) (P2)
subject to ∫ 1
0
x (x) gq (x|q1) dx = C (q1, θ1) (32)∫ 1
0
x (x) gq (x|q2) dx ≥ C (q2, θ2) (33)
together with majorization and monotonicity constraints. By Kuhn-Tucker’s conditions, the
lagrange multiplier associated with the inequality incentive constraint (33) must be either
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positive or zero (in case the constraint is slack). Thus, in order to show that γ2 is positive,
it is sucient to show that in (P2), (33) is binding.
Proof that (33) is binding. Suppose that (33) is slack. In this case, we can show that γ1
is positive. To see that we consider a planning problem without the constraint (33) and with
an inequality version of (32). It is straightforward to see that in this problem this constraint
must be binding since if slack the gain function Γ (x) = g (x|q1) /h (x) is decreasing and
thus optimal x (x) is full pooling which then violates the inequality incentive constraint.
Hence, γ1 ≥ 0.
Therefore, the gain function is given by Γ (x) = g (x|q1) /h (x)
[
1 + γ1
gq(x|q1)
g(x|q1)
]
. Den-
ing z (x) = g (x|q2) /g (x|q1) , we can write
Γ (x) = Γˆ (z (x)) =
1
f1 + f2z (x)
[1 + γ1φ (z (x))]
where φ (·) is dened in Assumption
Since z (·) is increasing in x, determining the sign of Γ′ (x) is equivalent to that of Γˆ′ (z).
We have
Γˆ′ (z) = −f2 1 + γ1φ (z)
(f1 + f2z)
2 +
γ1φ
′ (z)
(f1 + f2z)(
(f1 + f2z)
2 Γˆ′ (z)
)′
= −f2γ1φ′ (z) + f2γ1φ′ (z) + (f1 + f2z) γ1φ′′ (z)
= (f1 + f2z) γ1φ
′′ (z) ≤ 0
Since by Assumption 3 φ′′ (z) ≤ 0, this implies that (f1 + f2z)2 Γˆ′ (z) is decreasing. Thus,
there must exist z1 where Γˆ′ (z) ≤ 0 for values of z ≤ z1 and Γˆ′ (z) ≥ 0 for values of z ≥ z1 .
It is possible that z1 = z = minx∈[0,1] g (x|q2) /g (x|q1) or z1 = z¯ = maxx∈[0,1] g (x|q2) /g (x|q1).
Since Γ (x) must have the same property, using Proposition 8 there must exist a cuto x1
so that below x1, optimal x (·) is fully revealing while above x1 is pooling. Now given that
optimal x (x) has this shape when (32) is slack for i = 2, consider an innitesimal increase
in q2 accompanied by a uniform increase in x (·) for all values of x so that the change in
x (x), δx (x) = f2δq2. Since (33) is slack, this perturbed allocation keeps it satised. More-
over, since δx (x) is constant this perturbation keeps (32) unchanged. Finally, majorization
is satised since the perturbed x (·) is equal to x only at one point and is higher than x for
values of x below this point. This leads to the desired contradiction as this perturbation
increases the payo of type 1 sellers.
Having proven that γ2 is positive, we can use Assumption 3 to characterize the optimal
rating system. Note that in this case, the gain function is given by
Γ (x) = Γˆ (z (x)) =
1
f1 + f2z (x)
[1 + γ1φ (z (x)) + γ2ψ (z (x))]
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We have
Γˆ′ (z) =− f2 1 + γ1φ (z) + γ2ψ (z)
(f1 + f2z)
2
+
γ1φ
′ (z) + γ2ψ′ (z)
f1 + f2z
(f1 + f2z)
2 Γˆ′ (z) =− f2 [1 + γ1φ (z) + γ2ψ (z)]
+ (f1 + f2z) [γ1φ
′ (z) + γ2ψ′ (z)](
(f1 + f2z)
2 Γˆ′ (z)
)′
= (f1 + f2z) [γ1φ
′′ (z) + γ2ψ′′ (z)]
There are two possibilities:
1. The multiplier γ1 is negative. In this case, γ1φ′′ (z) + γ2ψ′′ (z) ≥ 0 by Assumption (3)
which implies that either Γ′ (x) is always positive or negative for low values of x and
positive for high values. Hence, by Proposition (8) the solution is of the form
x (x) =
{
Eh [x|x < x2] x < x2
x x ≥ x2
where Eh [·|·] is conditional expectation according to the distribution H (·) and x2 ∈
[0, 1]. The above proves the claim since in this case x1 = 0.
2. The multiplier γ1 is positive. In this case, the sign of γ1φ′′ (z) + γ2ψ′′ (z) cannot be
determined. However, part 3 of Assumption 3 implies that it is negative for low values
of z while it is positive for high values of z. Hence, either Γˆ′ (z) < 0 which means
that Γˆ′ (z) (and as a result Γ′ (x))only switches sign once, or Γˆ′ (z) > 0 which means
that Γˆ′ (z) at most changes sign twice. By Proposition 3, all of these cases lead to the
optimal rating structure stated in the Proposition. This concludes the proof.
B An Algorithm for Construction of Signals
Here, we provide a construction algorithm when the distribution of θ is discrete. The al-
gorithm illustrates that a combination of a rather small class of rating systems, those that
simply pool qualities together, can always implement a vector of signaled qualities. Before
describing the algorithm, we dene two classes of signals; for convenience, we work with
measures over posterior beliefs.
1. Interval pooled system: For any two indices k < l, an interval pooled signal, rep-
resented by σk→l ∈ ∆ (∆ (Θ)), is one in which all qualities ql, · · · , qk send the same
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signal while the qualities of all other types are fully revealed. Formally,
σk→l ({ei}) = fi,∀i < k, i > l
σk→l
({
fk
fk + · · ·+ flek + · · ·+
fl
fl + · · ·+ fk el
})
= fk + · · ·+ fl; otherwise,
where ei ∈ ∆ (Θ) is a vector that is 1 in its i-th element and 0 otherwise.
2. Two-point pooled system: For any two indices k < l, a two-point pooled signal,
represented by σk,l ∈ ∆ (∆ (Θ)), is one in which qualities ql and qk send the same
signal while the qualities of all other types are fully revealed. Formally,
σk,l ({ei}) = fi,∀i 6= k, l
σk,l
({
fk
fk + fl
ek +
fl
fk + fl
el
})
= fl + fk.
We also refer to the fully informative signal as τFI ∈ ∆ (∆ (Θ)) with τFI ({ei}) = fi.
Now consider the vectors of signaled and true qualities, q 6=q, such that q <F q. Then the
following algorithm can be used to construct the rating system that implements the signaled
quality q:
Algorithm 1. Start by letting r =q. Let l and k be dened as follows:
k = arg min
i
qi > ri
and
l = arg min
i>k
qi < ri.
1. If for all values of j ∈ {k, · · · , l − 1}, qj > rj , let λˆ be dened as the highest value of
λ < 1 such that
λrj + (1− λ) fkrk + · · ·+ flrl
fk + · · ·+ fl ≥ qj,∀j ∈ {k, · · · , l − 1}
λrl + (1− λ) fkrk + · · ·+ flrl
fk + · · ·+ fl ≤ ql
with at least one equality. Using this value of λˆ, we construct τˆ =
(
1− λˆ
)
σk→l + λˆτFI
and r˜ = diag (f)−1
∫
∆(Θ)
µµT rdτˆ .
• If for some value of j ∈ {k, · · · , l − 1}, qj = rj , let k′ ∈ {k + 1, · · · , l − 1} satisfy
qk′ > rk′ and qk′+1 = rk′+1. In addition, let λˆ be the highest value of λ < 1 that satises
λrk′ + (1− λ) fk′rk′ + flrl
fk′ + fl
≤ qk′
λrl + (1− λ) fk′rk′ + flrl
fk′ + fl
≥ ql,
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with at least one of the above holding with equality. Using this value of λˆ, we construct
τˆ =
(
1− λˆ
)
σk,l + λˆτFI and r˜ = diag (f)−1
∫
∆(Θ)
µµT rdτˆ .
• If r˜ 6= q, repeat the above steps replacing r with r˜.
The proof that this algorithm works uses the fact that the setS dened in (6) is convex. In
each step of the above algorithm, the number of elements of r andq that are dierent shrinks
by at least l. As a result, the repetition of this procedure, while keeping majorization intact,
gives us the rating system that mapsq intoq. As the algorithm shows, the constructed signal
is derived from a repeated application of interval and two-point pooled signals. While we do
not show an equivalent result for continuous distributions, one can use the above algorithm
in an approximate form by approximating continuous distributions with discrete ones.
B.1 Proof of Algorithm (1)
Proof. For any q <F q, dene l and k as follows:
k = arg min
i
qi > qi
and
l = arg min
i>k
qi < qi
There are two possibilities:
1. For all values of j ∈ {k, · · · , l − 1} we have that qj > qj .
In this case, we dene the following signal
τˆ = λ · τFI + (1− λ) · σk→l
and its associated matrix
A = λ
∫
µµTdτFI + (1− λ)
∫
µµTdσk→l
= λI + (1− λ) Σk→l
Therefore
rˆi = (Aq)i =
{
qi i < k, i > l
λqi + (1− λ) i = k, · · · , l
Note that because of our choice of this transformation, the elements of pˆ are mono-
tone. This is because
· · · ≥ ql+1 ≥ ql ≥ λql+(1− λ) qk→l ≥ · · · ≥ λqk+1+(1− λ) qk→l ≥ λqk+(1− λ) qk→l > qk ≥ qk−1 ≥ · · ·
We can nd the highest value of λ ∈ [0, 1] such that one of the following equalities
hold
λqi + (1− λ) qk→l = qi, i = k, · · · , l
57
Such a value must exist since qi ≥ qi, ∀k < i < l and ql < ql. Let this value of λ be
called λˆ. From the denition of λ, it implies that the following inequalities must hold
∀j = k, · · · , l − 1, λˆqj +
(
1− λˆ
)
qk→l ≤ qj
λˆql +
(
1− λˆ
)
qk→l ≥ ql
Note further that by construction
fkrˆk + · · ·+ flrˆl = fkqk + · · ·+ flql
We then have
i∑
j=1
fj rˆj =

∑i
j=1 fjqj i < k∑k−1
j=1 fjqj +
∑i
j=k fj
[
λˆqj +
(
1− λˆ
)
qk→l
]
i = k, · · · , l − 1∑i
j=1 fjqj i = l
By the above inequalities the above obviously mean that
i∑
j=1
fj rˆj ≤
i∑
j=1
fjqj
This implies that in this constructed signal rˆ <F q. Moreover, obviously we must
have that q <F rˆ – from Lemma 2.
2. There exists j ∈ {k + 1, · · · , l − 1} such that qj = qj .
In this case, let k′ satisfy qk′ > qk′ and qk′+1 = qk′+1. This must necessarily exist since
qk > qk. Now let λˆ be the highest value of λ ∈ [0, 1] that satises
λqk′ + (1− λ) fk′qk′ + flql
fk′ + fl
≤ qk′
λql + (1− λ) fk′qk′ + flql
fk′ + fl
≥ ql
with at least one of the above holding with equality. Then we dene
τˆ = λ · τFI + (1− λ)σk′,l
Then obviously the resulting rˆ is monotone in its elements and with an argument
similar to above it F -majorizes q and is F -majorized by q.
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